The British prime minister, foreign secretary and defense secretary submitted a White Paper to the parliament recently entitled The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent. The paper is a comprehensive overview of the future of Britain's nuclear deterrent power ahead of the expected phasing out of the current Trident weapons systems, and is aimed at dealing with foreseeable long-range threats.
In practice, the paper constitutes a well prepared document that reflects Britain's approach vis-à-vis the dilemmas of building its strength and concept of security.
The British examined six alternatives, two of which were rejected outright: The option of fighter jets for short and medium ranges was rejected, as well as the option to employ transportable systems for short and medium range mobile missiles. The ranges were weighed in both these options – namely the distance to the target – and particularly the vulnerability of the systems in the event of a preemptive strike. There remained four options, which were thoroughly and methodically examined:
A) An air-based deterrent system: 20 transport aircraft carrying at least four cruise missiles (backed by a fleet of 20 fueling aircraft) that would be on constant alert on the ground.
B) A ship-based deterrent system: Three ships weighing 30,000 tons carrying ballistic missiles, some of which would be on constant maritime patrol.
C) A land-based deterrent system: Two ballistic missile launching areas, with 16 launching silos throughout each that would be on constant alert.
D) Submarine-based deterrent system: Three to four nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles, some of which would be on constant underwater patrol.
The main recommendation advocated basing Britain's entire deterrent capability on the last option – the submarine based deterrent system. This choice was substantiated by the fact that the air-based option may be vulnerable to a preemptive strike or interception; the land based deterrent system was ruled out because it was argued that it was more suited to a large country such as the US, but is perceived to be vulnerable and problematic in a small and dense population such as Britain's.
The submarine-based option was found to have a high survivability rate, and shown to be more evasive that maritime ships - both maritime options were found to me more cost effective than the air and land-based options.
Moreover, the document noted that ballistic missiles are a better option than cruise missiles, and that all the submarines in the submarine-based deterrent systems would be armed with ballistic missiles.
Principles for deterrence
The main principles for building British strength and deterrence, as noted in the document, were as follows:
1) Principle of "necessary minimum:" The objective – from a cost effective point of view, arms control and use of minimal force – is to suffice with a force that would constitute the necessary minimum required to act as a deterring power in face of the scope of foreseeable threats.
2) Principle of relying on a single platform and not on a triad – namely a combination of underwater, land and air-based systems as employed by the US and Russia. This is what distinguishes Britain from other nuclear powers.
3) Principle of independent power: Although Britain is guaranteed collective security (NATO), it reserves its independent decision in using force. According to Britain, the alliance's overall deterrent effect is reinforced by Britain's independence, employing its own territorial control and command mechanisms.
4) Principle of operational ambiguity: Although Britain is not ambiguous about the nature of its power for reasons owing to deterrence, it maintains ambiguity regarding situations in which it would resort to use of nuclear arms.
These guiding principles are what led the British government to decide on building its unique strength. It is doubtful whether Britain would have sufficed with a single-dimensional system if it could not lean on the extended deterrence provided by the US due to its membership in NATO. Britain's dependency on the US is also evident in that while it manufactures its own arms platform, (a stockpile of 180 warheads set to be
reduced to 160), it will receive its ballistic missiles (the Trident, set to be enhanced) from the United States.
This is the minimum amount of force Britain believes it will require in order to deter future threats posed by hostile nuclear countries, both old and new. Britain's method of deterrence is unique and stems from its location and industrial capabilities, yet it is also of interest because it is directed towards potential threats not only aimed at Britain