No respect from Russia
Kremlin adopts traditional pro-Arab policy; Moscow's position unlikely to change soon
It isn't difficult to guess what promoted Sergey Lavrov to rush here last week. The Russian foreign minister arrived in order to demonstrate his presence in our region following the Hamas coup in Gaza.
Russia, which is currently attempting to regain its status as a global power of equal strength to the United States, must demonstrate an active presence in the Middle East at a time when developments that may change it are taking place. Otherwise, it will be perceived both by the world and by itself as only a supporting player on a stage where the US, European Union, and United Nations play major roles. This was his visit's main purpose.
In addition to that, Lavrov sought to find out firsthand how Israel intends to address the new situation that has been created in the Palestinian arena and to also discover the genuine intentions of the other major players in the boiling Palestinian pot. This information would enable Russia to formulate its positions and take advantage of opportunities that would be created later on.
On the one hand, Jerusalem is well aware of the Russian foreign minister's intentions and also knows that Russia doesn't want to and also cannot do much in order to assist Israel. On the other hand, Moscow has shown creativity and determination in torpedoing moves aimed at restraining Iran: It supplies weapons to our enemies and does no't miss an opportunity to condemn military moves undertaken by Israel in order to defend against Hamas rocket terror.
Yet this is nothing compared to what Russia might do if top Kremlin officials feel they are being disparaged. Therefore, Jerusalem's policy is to refrain from upsetting the Russian bear. That is, honor the guest from Moscow and share information with him.
Foreign Minister Livni held a press conference following her meeting with Lavrov and Olmert met with him for a lengthy talk well covered by the media. Both of them reported to him on what was said behind the scene during the last Sharm summit, shared with him the thoughts and intentions to boost Mahmoud Abbas and create a "political horizon" for the Palestinians, and even told him they would not object to Russia supplying 100 armored vehicles to Abbas' forces in the West Bank.
Meanwhile, the Israeli officials again sought, without much hope, Russia's assistance in thwarting Iran's nuclear program and preventing the sale of advanced weapons systems to Syria and Iran – particularly various kinds of missiles that to some extent at least reach the hands of Hizbullah and Hamas.
In exchange, Lavrov issued several vague declarations that say nothing regarding the provision of Mig 31 fighter jets to Syria and met with families of abducted IDF soldiers. He too knows that Israeli public opinion can be bought for cheap if one knows to hit all the right emotional notes.
The question is whether this relationship is predestined. Can't Israel do more than this in order to bring about a global power such as Russia to take our interests and legitimate concerns regarding the armament of our enemies into consideration? In order to answer this question, we must first clarify the Russian interests in the Middle East and whether Russia has a Mideastern policy aimed at securing these objectives.
What do they want?
This is exactly what I tried to do during my last visit in Moscow. I met with Russian and foreign diplomats and journalists that follow developments in the Kremlin as well as with members of a research institute that has close ties to those who formulate Russia's Mideastern policy.
The most interesting finding is that Putin's Kremlin is an enigma to outside observers just as it was during Soviet rule. All that is clear is that it is Putin alone who makes the decisions, at least until he completes his second term in office in the middle of next year. This may be the case later too, but in a less direct way.
All the rest is a black box. Even first-rate commentators and academicians are feeling their way in the dark when they try to understand what's going on in Putin's inner circle, who belongs to it, and who has influence.
When it comes to the Middle East, the picture is actually clearer. The closest man to Putin in regional matters is our elderly and not particularly nice acquaintance Yevgeny Primakov. He was the foreign minister and prime minister serving under some of the former USSR's Communist Party's secretary-generals and presidents. He is also an avid supporter of the Arab positions and was openly Saddam Hussein's friend. The pensioner Primakov's influence is greater than that of current Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.
Under Primakov's influence, the Kremlin has adopted the traditional Mideastern policy that characterized the former Soviet Union. That is: To erode as much as is possible the American influence and hold on the region while acquiring Arab support through diplomatic backing and arms supplies.
The policy is the same old policy yet the motives and modus operandi are new: Now, for example, Russia aims to torpedo the US moves vis-à-vis Iran, Iraq and Syria not for ideological reasons, but rather, as an act of reprisal over the fact the US does not take Russia's interests and wishes in Europe into consideration.
The expansion of NATO to former Warsaw Pact countries, the plan to deploy American troops and an anti-missile system in the Czech Republic and in Poland, as well as the interference against Russian influence in Ukraine undermine Russia's national security and pride in the view of Putin and his people. The Kremlin responded by obstructing the efforts to curb the Iranian nuke plan, while arming Syria.
The Russian policy on Iran is influenced by yet another major interest: The fear of unrest in the Russian Federation's Muslim regions and states, and particularly in the Caucuses and in the South.
Russia does not fear a nuclear Iran: Russia could destroy all of Iran several times if it only dared threaten Russia, I was told by a senior researcher at the Institute of Middle East Studies in Moscow. Indeed, we don't want Iran to possess a nuclear bomb, but Russia would be able to handle it even if they acquire one, he said.
However, the Russians are scared of subversive Iranian activity that would prompt a radical Muslim rebellion in Muslim states in the Caucuses. Such rebellion could disrupt the supply of oil from the region and would force Russia to fight in other areas just as it fights in Chechnya. This fear is also the main element that dictates Russia's blatantly pro-Hamas policy.
Corporate matter
Another important element that dictates Russia's policy in the Middle East is the country's arms, missiles and airplane corporations, which make billions of dollars every year. These corporations are usually headed by former top communist officials who enjoy preferential treatment at the Kremlin, not only because of past ties with the communist establishment but also because of the "formidable financial basis" they provide for Putin and his close associates.
Almost anyone considered in the know in Moscow will tell you openly that corruption within the Russian establishment is an affliction that became chronic a long time ago and is almost as common as "borscht" at restaurants, and possibly even more so.
Arms corporations and their patrons in the Kremlin have an interest in exporting at almost any price. Therefore they sell weapons, submarines and missiles for billions of dollars to Iran, and a little less than a year ago they complied with Bashar Assad's requests. Russia erased 70 percent of the $12 billion owed by Syria for old arms deals, and now Moscow supplies the Syrians with new anti-tank missiles, relatively old anti-aircraft missiles, and new Mig 31 and Mig 29 fighter jets. For now, Putin refuses to sell Syria accurate surface-to-surface Iskander missiles.
Russia's official argument used to justify these sales is that we are not talking about offensive weapons, but rather, defensive ones, and in any case they do not change the regional balance of power. This is an odd argument, particularly when uttered by Putin, who argues that the American system aimed at intercepting ballistic missiles in the Czech Republic and Poland constitutes a strategic threat to Russia's national security.
Israeli protests over the supply of rockets to Syria and through it to Hizbullah and Hamas enjoyed some attention in Russia up until last summer - as long as the influential Russian defense establishment respected Israel's military power. In the wake of the IDF's performance in the Second Lebanon War, the Kremlin too has no respect for us.
The bottom line: As long as Putin is in power, Russia is home to a presidential election campaign that plays on the nationalistic feelings of Russian citizens. And as long as Russia faces confrontation with the US in Europe and is scared of unrest in its Muslim republics, there is no chance for the apathetic Moscow-Jerusalem relationship to warm up.
