The report, which is expected to be very comprehensive, will span all aspects of the war, including military readiness of all sorts – use of force, training, strategy, etc. – but will not include any personal recommendations.
Sources close to the commission told Ynet the report "will be harsh and will be presented to the public, so it may decide for itself who should be held responsible for the war's failures."
'Major failures in judgment'
The final report will also focus on government decision-making during the war, including the decision to cease fire and the fighting that occurred during the war's final two days, after the UN Security Council announced Resolution 1701.
It details the relations between the government and military, especially when questions regarding use of force as part of the overall strategy were concerned; home front readiness, the Israeli society's ethos and the war's aftermath.
The commission also reviewed the years leading up to the Second Lebanon War, and the part decisions made by past governments played in the country's war readiness.
Winograd's interim report, published some eight months after the war, spoke of "major failures in judgment, responsibility, and caution," and was widely considered one of the harshest reports published in the past few years.
"The prime minister is responsible for failing to clearly set out the aims of the war, and for there not being a clear definition of aims of war and ways to achieve them," said the interim report.
"The main responsibility for these severe failures lies with the prime minister, the defense minister, and the former chief of staff. Had they acted differently, the results would have been different," it added.