PM Olmert
Photo: AFP
The power of weakness
Olmert’s weakness may in fact be a strength that enables him to pursue bold moves
The descriptions of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s paleness and subdued mood are fitting not only for the past week, ever since he found out what his best friends told the police about him. For a while now Olmert has not been the same man we have come to know.
In a conversation with a friend a few weeks ago, the prime minister went as far as making a despaired comparison between himself and his predecessor. Olmert claimed that Sharon was not “killed” by the blood thinners he was prescribed, but rather, by the investigations, persecution, and sense that he could not enjoy a quiet moment. Olmert also estimated that his “friends” were on the right track to killing another prime minister, and predicted that after the probes against him over the Bank Leumi affair and his Jerusalem home will dissipate, a new story will emerge shortly thereafter.
It’s uncertain whether Olmert knew how serious the latest affair will be, and even though at this time it would be exaggerated to say that the noose has tightened around his neck, it is clear that because of the frequency and accumulation of affairs Olmert is now back to the weak status he assumed when he delivered his “I’m an unpopular prime minister” speech.
Today, Olmert is a weak prime minister, and the natural tendency is of course to express frank concern regarding his ability to lead a complex state such as Israel. On the other hand, how about the opposite thesis: In a state that is as complex as Israel, a weak prime minister can actually do things that strong and popular leaders are scared to do.
For example, let’s take the decision faced by every prime minister: Engaging in courageous and very unpopular negotiations with Syria. No secret messages and no deliberate headlines about the willingness to pay the price – rather, genuine talks. A prime minister that enjoys public and parliamentary support knows that going into this arena could cost him dearly. The ability to possibly reach a deal with Syria will always be weighed against the possibility of dropping in the polls and seeing the coalition collapse.
Israeli politics has rules of its own
But what does Olmert have to lose? If there is truth to the reports that the prime minister, with the backing of most members of the defense establishment, supports the Syrian option, is there a better time for him to disregard what people say about him and do something that may earn him a few lines in Wikipedia that have nothing to do with being investigated under warning?Israeli politics always had rules of its own: The Left was always more suitable for wars, while the Right was always better suited to bring peace. Prime ministers gained political calm when they did nothing (Shamir) but were ousted (Barak) or killed (Rabin) when they gambled on doing something. Perhaps the time has come for Olmert to prove that in Israeli politics weakness is sometimes strength.
The logical argument that no Arab ruler would risk negotiating with an Israeli prime minister at the end of his political road may disqualify this thesis, unless we recall that these rulers weren’t quite eager to embrace our prime ministers even when they were at their peak. I won’t be guessing if I suspect that some of Olmert’s potential successors would be willing to pay plenty so that he builds the foundation for them, and just like Netanyahu submissively accepted the Oslo Accords, they too will accept what was formulated before their time.
And another matter: Many of our politicians found themselves facing criminal charges because they needed large sums of money to finance their campaigns. We are the ones who got them accustomed to the fact that we can be bought with plenty of bells and whistles, and with expensive campaigns, and that we do not listen when someone talks to us quietly, wisely, and modestly.
Perhaps now is the time, a moment before Olmert may end his political career because of fundraising for the purpose of fooling the public, for him to be wise enough to embark on a real move, the kind that allows statesmen to leave their mark on history – and for the right reasons.
