Yaron London
Photo: Yonatan Davis
The Syrian option
As Hizbullah inches closer to Lebanon takeover, we must reassess new options
A few weeks ago, I wrote here: “In a few years…either through arms or through the polls, Muslim Shiites will complete their takeover of Lebanon.”
I am no expert on Lebanese affairs, but I did not need to be too daring to make this prediction.
The essence of it is that the Shiites comprise the largest ethnic group in Lebanon and its members are stimulated by a justified sense of discrimination intermixed with religious zealotry. The Shiites face many ethnic groups with contradictory interests. And most of all: The Shiites are willing to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their aspirations, while the other groups are unwilling to do so.
I based my assessment on lessons learned back in the first Lebanon War, where we were surprised by the weakness and corruption of Lebanon’s Christian community. To that I added the lessons of the Second Lebanon War, as well as demographic figures and other facts that are clear to all.
Chaos
Clashes break out again in port city of Tripoli between supporters of Western-backed government, militants loyal to Hizbullah-led opposition. Six days of fighting leave at least 59 people dead, nearly 200 wounded
The tight relationship between Lebanon’s Shiites and Iran was not a necessary result of the religious affinity between them, but the religious beliefs were tied together with the Shiites’ social interests, thereby creating a reality with immense strategic importance. A history buff could spot what intelligence officers and political leaders in Jerusalem failed to see.
And while we’re preoccupied with the latest Olmert affair, my prediction is coming true faster than I expected. Hizbullah did not wait for ongoing pressure and measured moves to topple the secular government, which is influenced by Western democratic tradition. Instead, Hizbullah is already engaging in a drill of taking over Beirut, a city that symbolizes control over the entire country.
The violence on Beirut’s streets again proved the helplessness of Hizbullah’s opponents. Sunni Arab states and Western powers did not threaten military intervention and made do with calling on both sides to settle their differences through negotiations.
The verdict’s execution has been postponed a little, because for the time being Hizbullah prefers to govern without assuming upon itself the responsibility required from a ruling party. Yet when its leaders wish to do so, the movement would take the helm and we shall find ourselves rubbing up against a dark Shiite state, which serves as an Iranian outpost. This outpost is equipped with tens of thousands of rockets whose range covers all of Israel’s population centers, and once it utilizes its full power, Hizbullah would enjoy territorial depth and have seaports and airports at its disposal.
Reexamine wars in Lebanon
Against this backdrop, it is worthwhile to reexamine the motives and purpose for the first two Lebanon wars. In the first one we forged an empty alliance with the declining element in Lebanon’s population and missed out on an opportunity to gain the trust of the Shiites. In the second war we failed to properly define our objectives and we underestimated the enemy.
As opposed to those who believe that we should not have embarked on the war or that we should have minimized it to a short and deterring retaliatory blow, I believe that had we predicted what was in store, we would have expanded the war’s objectives and defined them as weakening Hizbullah to the point of it not being able to restore its power within a few years.
What we failed to do then, we shall be forced to do under more difficult conditions, unless we are able to secure peace with Syria.
And this is what I wrote last time: Upon the elimination of the Christian hegemony in Lebanon, the old Israeli interest in maintaining an independent Lebanon will dissipate. The real alternatives are an Iranian Lebanon or a Syrian Lebanon. We do not know the price Syria will be willing to pay for a secret pledge that Israel would not do a thing to prevent Lebanon’s annexation to Syria, but it is worthwhile looking into it – this price may be Syrian willing to renounce its claims for the Golan.
