Maintaining our deterrence
Palestinians firing rockets to show Gaza op failed; Israel must respond to provocations
Part 1 of analysis
The “victory narrative” adopted by the resistance does not take into account the hundreds of thousands uninvolved Gazans who were hurt or remained homeless. The small radical groups that are producing the provocations also have a political objective and are acting on Iran’s orders – they are aiming to push Israeli voters to the Right. This way they are hoping to reinforce Israel’s
isolation in the international arena and prompt a schism between the Jewish state and the Obama administration.
It is quite clear why the Palestinians continue to launch rockets. This is in fact their way to prove to the world that the Cast Lead offensive failed: The IDF was unable to end the rocket terror and the attacks near the Gaza fence. Hence, the Palestinian “resistance” won.
Ongoing Fire
Shmulik Hadad
Air Raid siren sounds in southern city shortly after 7 am, followed by explosion. Grad rocket lands between buildings in residential neighborhood; three people suffer shock, several cars damaged
What is less clear is why Israel is not responding powerfully, as its leaders promised it would do. After all, every child in Israel knows today that “maintaining the deterrence” is even more important than the “basic deterrence” achieved via the large-scale and concentrated military blow in Gaza. However, at a time when negotiations regarding a stable and long-term ceasefire are still going on in Egypt, we need the Israeli response to have a significant effect in order to achieve deterrence, while at the same time avoiding an all-out flare-up that would require IDF forces to again enter the Strip.
Coping with Gaza-based terror in the past eight years taught the IDF and the Shin Bet that hitting a Qassam rocket workshop or a smuggling tunnel on the Philadelphi Route does not affect Hamas or the other small groups that are currently creating the provocations. Therefore, security officials have decided to change the pattern of response at this time. Instead of creating “holes in walls” the defense establishment has decided to wait with the response until what the IDF characterizes as an “operational opportunity” emerges: A situation whereby intelligence officials identify a target such as a major weapons warehouse that has not yet been hit or a Palestinian commander that has come out of hiding – at that time, aircraft will be dispatched to hit such target.
Usually, such targets only become available for a very brief period of time or are located near civilians – at such junctions, the ability to hit a target like this is measured in minutes. The winter weather conditions that prevail at this time also limit the army’s ability to identify and hit such targets. All of the above requires a patient wait until all the right conditions coalesce to enable an effective yet not overly destructive response to the Gaza provocations; the type of blow that would be appropriate for the current conditions and circumstances.
The considerations that dictate a wait for an “operational opportunity” are wise and correct in and of themselves, yet their visible result is perceived on the Palestinian side as a case of Israeli hesitation to act, for fear of an international response; at the same time, Israeli citizens are frustrated when they see the deterrence achieved via Operation Cast Lead evaporating before their very eyes.
Part 2 of Ron Ben-Yishai’s analysis to be published Tuesday evening
