What the comptroller doesn’t understand about the Security Cabinet
Analysis: During Operation Protective Edge, there were at least three ministers in the cabinet who wanted to succeed Netanyahu and saw the operation as an opportunity to build themselves up at his expense. The leaks were only part of the problem. Running a military operation that way is impossible.
The report’s first draft included harsh criticism against the Military Intelligence Directorate and the Shin Bet. The tunnel affair was described first and foremost as an intelligence failure.
In the second draft, following explanations provided by the two bodies, the tide was turned: The comptroller has a lot compliments for the intelligence community's information gathering efforts, starting from 2008 and mainly since the end of 2013. He describes the information provided to the fighting forces as an important intelligence achievement, which allowed the troops to reach the entries to most offensive tunnels. The Military Intelligence Directorate and the Shin Bet understood the seriousness of the tunnel threat and gave the defense minister and prime minister detailed reports. They defined the threat as significant and strategic. In other words, the fail grade in the draft turned into a citation in the report.
Operation Protective Edge was not free of mistakes. Of all the mistakes made before, during and after the operation, the comptroller is occupied primarily with one issue: The Security Cabinet’s performance. He is harshly reprimanding Prime Minister Netanyahu, then-defense minister Moshe Ya’alon and then National Security Council head Yossi Cohen for their conduct. In this context, he is also scolding the IDF’s top command, as well as the members of cabinet.
According to the report, the cabinet should have set strategic targets for Gaza. It did not do so because Netanyahu and Ya’alon did not bother to bring the issue up for discussion. Instead, they presented the cabinet with operative plans. The result was that the military command was forced to form the targets itself and plan the military operations accordingly.
The comptroller states that most cabinet ministers did not show an interest in the tunnel threat even when it was presented to them. He mentions four cabinet meetings, two in March 2014 and two at the end of June and July. Netanyahu and Ya’alon did not demand that the IDF present the tunnel threat to the cabinet, and the IDF did not volunteer to do so. The comptroller holds Netanyahu and Ya’alon accountable, but does not deny the responsibility of the IDF commanders as well. Although the IDF is not in direct contact with the cabinet, although the law does not require reporting, the comptroller believes that the IDF chief of staff and the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate have a responsibility towards the government too.
The comptroller understands that there is a lot of information. He also understands that the ministers do not read much. He recommends, therefore, that the IDF suggest to the defense minister to recommend to the prime minister to allow officers to verbally complete what the ministers fail to read in writing. Complicated? If the recommendation sounds like the way to handle students suffering from learning difficulties, that’s exactly what it is.
The comptroller’s most convincing argument against the IDF is that it failed to prepare operational plans that included a reference to the tunnel threat. It is directed at Netanyahu and Ya’alon, who failed to instruct, and at IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz and Major-General Yoav Har-Even, head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, who failed to act. Gantz surely has answers. He showed indifference when the report moved from one draft to another. Now, ahead of its release, he is preparing for the public battle.
What Netanyahu would like to say to the comptroller, but can’t, is that the comptroller is barking up the wrong tree. The cabinet is not a solution—it’s a problem. It’s a baseless, futile body which is incapable of completing the missions it has been tasked with by the law. During Operation Protective Edge, there were at least three ministers in the cabinet who wanted to succeed Netanyahu and saw the operation as an opportunity to build themselves up at his expense. The leaks were only part of the problem. The more serious problem was that everyone spoke in headlines, and are still doing so to this very day. Running a military operation that way is impossible.
Decisions during military operations should be made in a much smaller forum—usually a forum that includes the prime minister, the defense and foreign ministers and the chief of staff. As we learned from Operation Cast Lead and the arguments between prime minister Ehud Olmert, foreign minister Tzipi Livni and IDF chief Gabi Ashkenazi, such a forum is not free of personal and political considerations either. In the current government, the composition is even more problematic. Netanyahu doesn’t have a cabinet, and he doesn’t have a narrow forum.
The comptroller criticizes Netanyahu for failing to come up with a strategy for Gaza. The truth is that he has a strategy, but he cannot expose it. He does not want to occupy Gaza because he is afraid to get stuck there; he does not want to impose the Palestinian Authority on Gaza because he finds the split convenient. A weakened Hamas and a major military conflict every few years—that was the strategy, and it is firm and valid to this very day.
The comptroller says no diplomatic alternatives were examined, including improving the infrastructure and quality of life in Gaza. He would be glad to hear that such alternatives are being examined today and rejected for fear that Netanyahu would be seen as giving in to Hamas. Soon Gaza will blow up, and what happened in the past will happen again.
