Foiling the terror attack near the Gaza Strip was a coup for the IDF Southern Command, in fact we are in the midst of one of the better periods in terms of our military defenses.
Israel invests in defense more per capita than any other country in the world.
This feeling of strength provides civilians with a sense of security, but it also allows politicians to maintain stagnation and avoid tackling the problems.
This is the kind of Nirvana that brought about the fiasco of the Yom Kippur War, when Israel was caught unprepared and off guard by invading armies from Egypt and Syria.
The same could be said for first and second Palestinian uprisings or Intifadas in 1987 and 2000 respectively and a possible third that may be yet to come.
The planned attack from Gaza was attempted by renegade Hamas forces who opposed their leadership's policy of maintaining calm on the border.
Judging by the equipment they were carrying, it seems they had the logistical ability for a prolonged battle in Israeli territory, perhaps carrying out kidnappings or hostage taking, ambushing military personnel and the like.
A week ago, another attempt to infiltrate across the border was carried out by another Hamas fighter who strayed from the terror organization's leadership policy and set out on his own accord.
The military response was tactical.
Beefing up security along the border and in fact the Gaza battalion successfully foiled the next infiltration attempt, but from the strategic perspective these incidents point to a weakening in the ranks of the military wing of Hamas.
If there is opposition to the leadership's policies inside the terror group, it will become more than Israel's problem.
If there is a successful attempt to carry out a major attack by operatives, it could force Israel into a war at an inopportune time and cause chaos inside the Gaza Strip.
Israel is today capable of signaling its discontent to Hamas through military means - it could make clear that it considers Hamas responsible for events.
But what happens once that message is delivered? What happens when the fringe forces of the extremes inside Hamas grow in numbers and in strength?
Is there anyone in our political leadership willing to consider and able to deal with such a dilemma?
Is anyone there able to take the initiative and consider pre-emptive steps? Or will they just continue the same tit for tat?
The tragic wakeup call of Dvir Sorek's murder should remind us that Mahmoud Abbas's cooperation with Israel is temporary.
His successor, regardless of who that may be, will be unlike him, both in his personal history his ideology and in his view of Israeli-Palestinian relations.
Last May West Bank social media erupted with condemnation of a textbook written by Abbas called "Our president, our ideals", in which the leader announced he was forfeiting his own right of return to Safed.
He also wrote that security cooperation with Israel was a Palestinian necessity.
Because of the public outcry, the book was pulled from its planned inclusion in the school curriculum.
The meaning is clear. Whoever comes after Abbas will have to adopt a much more combative stand towards Israel if he hopes to enjoy public support.
Furthermore, towards the end of the Abbas tenure, world attention to the Palestinian question has been sidelined.
Any political gains the Palestinians hope for will only be achieved through close dialogue with Israel.
This is an opportune time for Israel to advance the best political solutions, now that it is strong militarily and is relied on by the PA.
The murder of Sorek is a reminder of what could come after Abbas is gone.