It really doesn’t matter what Bennet said to Netanyahu or what Netanyahu said to Ya’alon
Photo: AFP/ Alex Kolomoisky
The real lesson from Operation Protective Edge
Analysis: A country which perceives itself as a military power cannot afford to be dragged into, and worn out in, repeated rounds of conflict by some 40,000 Hezbollah fighters and some 30,000 Hamas fighters, however 'hybrid-style' the conflicts may be.
War is a serious matter, but in the Security Cabinet—as the leaks reveal—there were not enough people during Operation Protective Edge who took it seriously. It was a group of politicians, some of whom didn’t bother to do their homework but who claim that the truth was concealed from them, and some of whom were busy childishly looking for headlines in order to tease the “landlord,” who kept ignoring them. Even he, the prime minister, didn’t think he was dealing with a strategic-nation cabinet which could come up with a policy for managing the war.
All this will be included in the state comptroller’s report, and that’s good. We will read it, click our tongues, and the politicians will still be unable to see beyond the end of their nose.
Operation Protective Edge. The IDF can no longer present plans for rounds of war lasting several weeks (Photo: Reuters)
I also doubt whether the current cabinet has held a thorough discussion, with the finest security minds, on the question of how we reached a situation in which Israel launches such long and expensive military battle and reaches such mediocre results, both from the military aspect and from the diplomatic aspect.
Why, at the end of every battle, is there a need for a PR campaign aimed at convincing the public that we did succeed after all? The enemy doesn’t raise a white flag, so they explain that it’s a “hybrid” war, that it’s a nonconventional enemy operating underground, and other fairytales.
What the cabinet should see every time it convenes is a large chart on the wall stating the following: The Second Lebanon War lasted 34 days, 166 soldiers and civilians were killed, the direct and indirect cost—direct military expenses, damage to the economy and the cost of property damages and casualties—was more than NIS 20 billion, which is 45 percent of the annual defense budget and 2.4 percent of the growth in the annual product; Operation Protective Edge lasted 50 days, the death toll was 73, the direct and indirect cost to the economy was about NIS 15 billion, which is 25 percent of the defense budget and 1.3 percent of the annual product.
These numbers point to an ongoing mishap, a failure we are being dragged into from operation to operation. The Israeli economy and home front may be strong enough to endure these figures, but the question is whether this is necessary and whether there is no other way.
Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, who is the IDF’s main “hybrid” enemy (half military-half terrorist), said in the past that victory over Israel would not be achieved through occupation but through social, economic, political and moral erosion. If the political-security system fails to find a formula for breaking this cycle of attrition which the enemy is dragging us into, the next military conflict will be much more expensive and painful, mainly on the home front. Because it’s no longer just about inaccurate short and medium-range rockets, it’s about a mass of long-range rockets and missiles, some highly accurate. In addition, Hezbollah and Hamas have the ability today to carry out disruptive ground activities in the Israeli home front.
Behind the scenes, both the army and the political echelons understand that these rounds of military conflicts cannot last for long. So the political echelon quietly complains about the generals who fail to think outside of the box, and the military echelon says the politicians are not brave enough and are not letting the army use its full force. One thing is clear: A country which perceives itself—and rightfully so—as a military power cannot afford to be dragged and worn out in rounds of conflict by some 40,000 Hezbollah fighters and some 30,000 Hamas fighters, as “hybrid” as they may be.
The army, therefore, can no longer present plans for rounds of war lasting several weeks. The intensity of the fire that Israel knows how to produce and should produce is capable of ending any conflict within several days. It’s much more expensive, from all aspects, to hang out by the tunnels for a month than to use full force against the most critical targets in the first 24 hours. Just not to “start out small” and “roll out” as the war progresses. This is the real lesson from Operation Protective Edge, not what Bennett said to Netanyahu and what Netanyahu said to Ya’alon, and so on and so forth.
