
The huge anti-Israel energies sizzling on the ground are constantly looking for outburst channels. If Hamas infrastructures are destroyed – local organizations of two or three members from the same village, or of an individual Palestinian who suddenly decided to do something, will flourish.
And so, precisely when the warning diary of the intelligence officer at the Central Command is empty, the army and police raise their alertness ahead of a terror attack which will be committed by an anonymous person whose name is not on any black list.
Every attempt by the Shin Bet and the army to build a psychological-social profile of a suicide bomber is doomed to fail, as we are talking about an endless mixture of frustrations, a security situation, discrimination, personal problems, a desire for revenge, and sometimes an economic situation too. Considering the fact that more than 700,000 Palestinians have been arrested since 1967, there is basically not a single Palestinian family which doesn’t have a score to settle with Israel.

Following the riots by East Jerusalem's Arabs last October-November, the Shin Bet took it upon itself to handle the "public order" and "popular terror" in the Jerusalem vicinity area, a duty which had been led until then by the Israel Police's Minorities Department. Since then, through professional intelligence work and by deploying networks, the Shin Ben has somewhat succeeded in reducing the flames and the mass riots. For how long? No one can commit to that.
In the West Bank as well, the Judea and Samaria Division and Shin Bet managed to clear the ground of activists, funds and proper weapons. But the driver who attacked at the a-Tur Junction on Wednesday or the one who will pop up tomorrow cannot be located, because no one knows how to enter the box between a person's ears. The Shin Bet and the army often issue statements about arrests of rioters, stone throwers and Molotov cocktail throwers, but they rarely issue a statement about the arrest of a terrorist who planned, for example, to stab a soldier.
All that is left to do is to take defense, deterrence and alertness measures. Defense – by defending hitchhiking stations, bus stops and train stations; deterrence – through security forces' presence on the routes and by arresting potential troublemakers; and alertness – just like Israel's residents have learned to pay attention to packages with no owners, they will have to get used to pay attention to the unnatural behavior of a vehicle or a person around it.
As far as the Palestinian Authority is concerned, the lone wolf terrorist is the ideal way to maintain ongoing unrest on the ground. The PA is talking today about the diplomatic struggle as the main struggle against Israel, but it relies on regular unrest and small bonfires on the ground – whether popular riots on the fence or the activity of lone terrorists, which expresses authentic rage that earns the world's understanding and sympathy. The PA doesn’t want a violent intifada, but that lone terrorist could ignite the next intifada – against the Palestinian interest and against the Israeli interest.
A war game conducted recently by the Judea and Samaria division examined several situations which could ignite that overall violence on the ground, what we refer to as "the third intifada."
One of the realistic scenarios presented in the exercise was a flare-up on the ground following a growing mass of lone terrorists carrying out attacks which cause unbearable extents of damage and death – which will lead to a harsh Israeli response, massive friction with local populations and an inflammation on the ground. This is, therefore, the big threat concealed in the growing drizzle of these spontaneous attacks.
There will come a stage, therefore, when Israel will have no choice but to restore much harsher deterrence measures than the ones taken today – as long as the court approves them, of course.