Abbas and Arafat
A year without Arafat
No major changes in wake of Arafat’s death
This week marks the first anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat, and the complete failure of all the attempts to deconstruct the possibilities of "the day after."
Omri Dagan is an analyst at the Re'ut Institute in Tel AvivLast year, commentators vacillated between two extremes: One dealt with the possibility of ending the current circle of bloodshed, perhaps even the possibility to reach a peace agreement.
The other assumed there was no reason to expect change in the foreseeable future.
Now, a year later, it is a good opportunity to come down, somewhere in the middle, and to ask: What has happened since then in the domestic Palestinian and policy arenas?
Identity war
In the domestic Palestinian arena, Arafat's death signaled the first shot in the war for Palestinian identity. The best expression of this relates to the growing tension between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.
In this area, Hamas has made strides in the last year to create parity with the PA by preserving its independent military capability, creating an alternative civil framework, defining "out of bounds" areas for the Palestinian police and even conducting its own foreign policy.
On the other hand, the Palestinian Authority has gotten steadily weaker. If in the past Arafat refused to use the forces at his disposal to enforce his will on extremist forces, at the moment Chairman Mahmoud Abbas has a very different challenge.
Undermining Abbas
Hamas' entry to positions of municipal power and its expected participation in the Palestinian Legislative Council undermine Abbas' ambition to represent residents of Gaza and the West Bank, and hurt his ability to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure and carry out constitutional reform.
There are several direct policy effects of this. First, there was widespread expectation that after Arafat's death –and especially after the disengagement – pressure would build on Israel to negotiate with the Palestinian leadership. That expectation has disappeared.
The anger amongst the Palestinian leadership, which only strengthened after the Gaza pullout, has allowed Israel to continue claiming "there is no one to talk to."
Secondly, Abbas may speak of the "Road Map", but in practice he has had no luck implementing even the first stage of the plan, which calls for consolidating Palestinian security organizations, dismantling armed gangs and preventing the development and production of war materials.
In addition, he has ignored the existence of the second phase of the road map, which calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state with interim borders, proposing instead to jump directly to the third phase – according to which a Palestinian state is to be established only after signing a peace treaty with Israel.
U.S. backs Israel
The United States, which claimed at the time that Arafat was the obstacle to the Road Map, is currently occupied with developments in Iraq. Therefore, despite the fact that Arafat is no longer in the picture, the U.S. has no intention to dictate new timeframes or schedules to Israel and the Palestinians to coincide with the end of Bush's term in January, 2009.
In practice, this means that President Bush has accepted Israel's position that the ball is in the Palestinian court, and it is incumbent on them to prove they can control Gaza, as a basis for moving forward in the future.
In doing so, he (Bush) has rejected Abbas' request to spur on talks immediately on final status issues, including Jerusalem, borders and refugees.
No change
Therefore, we can say that the end of the Arafat era did not immediately change political reality, if only because the agreement between the United States and Israel, who demand action before advancing to negotiations and promises.
At the same time, Palestinian elections, scheduled for this January, are an important landmark , according to which it will be possible to then discern whether-or-not Arafat's cronies thwarted change in Palestinian politics, and therefore perhaps in the diplomatic process.
After a year-and-two-months cooling off period from Arafat, the Palestinian street will go to the polls to determine its future.
100 days grace
One hundred days of charity from the Palestinians' elected leadership will show whether we are watching the creation of a "responsible" address, with the ability to make decisions and carry them out for the good of the Palestinian people.
This ability has several ingredients, including available human and economic capital; domestic and international legitimacy; political ability to survive in power; the ability to ratify decisions of the executive or legislative branches in legal and judicial institutions; and the ability to join forces in order to realize the government's policies.
The formation of an address does not necessarily suggest the Palestinians will display a willingness to take political or diplomatic risks, or to take part in a diplomatic process.
At the same time, it makes it possible for Israel to stand, for better or worse, opposite one personality, rather than different bodies and groups like the old guard of the PLO, the heads of the various Palestinian security services, Fatah Hawks, Hamas, Islamic Jihad or prisoner groups.
If, after elections, the power struggles continue between these groups, there will be no address. Then, we will be able to conclude that there is no potential in Arafat's cronies.
After all, what was is sure to be again.
