IDF broadens offensive

The IDF and Shin Bet can boast an achievement: The intensive and diverse anti-terror activity deployed from the air and ground has led to a considerable decline in the number and quality of Qassam rocket attacks from Gaza in recent days.

The weather, which cleared up in the past few days, also contributed significantly to the accomplishment and enabled the IDF's observation and fire means to maximizing their detection and attack capabilities. As a result, Hamas and Islamic Jihad launching teams almost don't dare deploy and fire rockets during daylight in recent days.

They place them under cover of darkness and make use of timing devices in order to get away from the area quickly before the launch and before being detected. They are also getting away from their "traditional" launch sites, where the IDF maintains a constant aerial and ground presence, and move on to alternative launch sites, with many of them located beyond the range of Sderot and Ashkelon. This is the reason why a considerable number of the rockets are now being directed at Israeli communities near the Gaza fence, rather than Sderot.

On top of this we should make note of the IDF's attacks on commanders and activists in the rocket-launching network while they are on the move, as well as the attacks on Qassam warehouses and workshops. These hits minimized the rocket stockpiles possessed by Hamas and whatever is left cannot be easily transferred from one location to another. That is, beyond the operational problem, the Qassam teams are also facing a logistical problem.

All this is good news for Israel, but it is not good enough.

Why? Because the moment this constant and intensive IDF pressure ends, Hamas and Islamic Jihad would be able to draw lessons, rehabilitate with the help of Iran and Hizbullah, and continue to strengthen ahead of the next round. This is how a guerilla group works. It fans and reduces the flames in accordance with its interests and dictates the timing, rate, and location of fighting to the other side.

This is why Hamas is currently proposing, through Mahmoud Abbas, a return to the "calm," on condition that it also includes an end to IDF anti-terror operations in the West Bank. The objective here is clear: Once the fighting renews, Hamas would be able to operate against us, and particularly against its rival Fatah, while enjoying improved opening positions in Judea and Samaria as well.

Double-edged sword 

The IDF is well aware of these intentions by Hamas' radical branch and military wing, which dictate the modus operandi to the entire organization at this time. Therefore, and very wisely so, the Shin Bet now proposed to the prime minister and political leadership to utilize Hamas' logic against it: If Hamas ties the Qassam rocket attacks in Gaza to what is going on in the West Bank, let's show it this is a double-edged sword - the Shin Bet and IDF can operate based on the same principle and hit Hamas assets in the West Bank, which are the organization's soft underbelly, in order to press it to end the Gaza rocket attacks.

Hamas' main asset in the West Bank is the "Dawa" - the welfare system funded by donations and outside elements that enables Hamas to exercise political control in major West Bank cities and recruit activists for its military wing.

This is the reason why a few days ago the IDF detained dozens of Hamas activists, including the mayors of Qalqilia and Nablus, who are key figures in the political and military infrastructure set up by Hamas with great effort in Judea and Samaria.

Without this infrastructure, Hamas has no chance against Fatah in the West Bank. We must recall that the true battle is the one between Hamas and Fatah for control of the Palestinian street. The fighting in Gaza started because security apparatuses loyal to Abbas and Fatah attempted to deploy their forces in the Strip in a bid to prevent anarchy and curb the rocket attacks.

Hamas started bombarding Sderot only in order to divert the Palestinian public's attention from the fighting against the "brothers" from Fatah. Therefore, when the IDF and Shin Bet operate resolutely in order to weaken Hamas vis-a-vis Fatah in the West Bank, this constitutes a serious threat even for members of Izz al-Din al-Qassam and the organization's radical political leaders.

Fatah will remain weak in Gaza

The Shin Bet and IDF already resorted to similar action following the abduction of Gilad Shalit, and this was one of the reasons Hamas entered intense negotiations on releasing the abducted IDF soldier. Meanwhile, some of the political figures arrested at the time were released due to legal considerations and as a goodwill gesture in the framework of the negotiations.

The arrests of Hamas activists in the West Bank, just like the warning bombing raids against Gaza money changers who help fund Hamas, will likely have an effect. The result will not be seen immediately, but the method of "constant multi-system offensive" currently being utilized by the Shin Bet and IDF against Hamas is apparently proper and also effective.

Hamas will be weakened - but the trouble is that Fatah in the Gaza Strip will apparently be unable to strengthen. The burden of stabilizing the situation in the Strip will therefore continue to be placed on Israel's shoulders.

Jerusalem now has to ask itself how it will respond if Hamas unilaterally stops the Qassam attacks or attempts, with the assistance of Mahmoud Abbas, to force Israel to agree to a ceasefire that would also include the West Bank. We must recall that Abbas enjoys the support of the US and moderate Arab leaders, and therefore his subjugation to Hamas in the framework of the Palestinian national unity government has turned into yet another threat on Israel.

The Israeli government will likely reject a proposal that ties the end of Qassam rocket attacks from Gaza to an end to IDF anti-terror operations in the West Bank. Israel has already rejected a "softer" plan recently proposed by Condoleezza Rice that included easing of restrictions on the Palestinians in exchange for security.

The IDF counter-terrorism operations will therefore continue both in Gaza and in the West Bank, yet if Qassam attacks stop, the intensity of IDF attacks in Gaza will also decrease (among other things as a result of pressure by the US, which would want to give Abbas another chance) - until a new sort of calm takes root, and so on and so forth.