Mission of deterrence

Tuesday's newspaper headlines read: "Every fourth youth doesn't enlist in the IDF" (Yedioth Ahronoth); "Bush: Peace summit this autumn" (Ha'aretz); "Plans underway for nuclear shelters" (Ma'ariv). All three headlines reflect different types of defeatist attitudes and processes.

The international summit is likely to become a setting for unilateral Israeli concessions and withdrawals from Judea and Samaria. The deliberations over nuclear shelters indicate acquiescence with the nuclearization of the Middle East and raises doubts as to the ability of the international community or Israel to halt this process. Draft-dodging from the IDF certainly does not signify the fighting spirit necessary in a country that is in the midst of a struggle.

Let us not be surprised if, parallel to the draft-dodging by today's youth, the ranks of those wishing to embrace the international summit will only swell. Even the calls for a resolution with Syria set to be predicated on widespread concessions, rest upon the contention that calm will be achieved by concessions, rather than through the force of deterrent capability.

These need not be the processes and attitudes at this hour. The main effort now must be directed towards the Iranian front and focused on Iran's nuclear efforts, rather than towards the Palestinians. The side that needs to be empowered is not Mahmoud Abbas, who is unreliable, but rather Israel itself.

Decapitation strategy successful

Israel's strengthening, especially militarily, is the call of the hour in light of the significant cracks that were revealed in the last war. Suitable diplomatic settlements will be secured only on the basis of military and diplomatic power, and not by the prevailing attitudes of inferiority. Calm can also be achieved through deterrence, and this requires convincing military power.

Strengthening Israel's deterrence must be the defense establishment's top priority. This is especially true in light of the developments in the last year indicating that Iran, Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas have all reached the conclusion that Israel does not possess full and sufficient defenses against their missile and rocket capabilities, and that the Israeli home front is highly vulnerable to such attacks.

Had Israel indeed succeeded, through its massive response to Hizbullah's limited provocation, to somewhat restore its deterrence vis-à-vis that organization, the mismanagement of the Second Lebanon War and subsequent developments have impaired Israel's deterrent image vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel must therefore revive and strengthen components of its deterrent capability and position them across the array of threats facing it. In essence, it has already specified some of the necessary deterrence responses. Against low-intensity threats such as Palestinian terrorism, Israel achieved a significant measure of deterrence due to targeted killings. These actions have disrupted the enemy's capabilities and taken a heavy toll on the perpetrators and those who dispatched them. This strategy of "decapitation" has a proven deterrent dividend.

This strategy may also prove to be effective against military actions of a higher intensity, such as those that Syria might take. In face of the Israeli home front's vulnerability to missiles and rockets, there is also a clear vulnerability on the part of the Syrian regime to Israeli power projection. It can be surmised that  strong and effective Israeli deterrence, coupled with threats directed at the regime, will somewhat quell the winds of war blowing through the Syrian capital.

Widespread mobilization needed

But the foremost challenge, as indicated earlier, is coping with the Iranian threat. This threat, if it develops into military nuclear capability, will require a complex and comprehensive deterrent response. Shelters and passive defense have a certain deterrent value, particularly in the context of missile defense. Active defense, which includes a deterrent value, is even more relevant. But the most important component is the punitive measure.

In this context, we must mention the "Shimon Peres formula." When he was asked some time ago of his opinion regarding the threats of destruction emanating from Iran, he laconically replied: "Iran could be destroyed as well." This answer embodies the strategy of "decapitation." And if this formula is insufficient to deter the “undeterrable,” this might not be the highest level of required deterrence.

These are the assignments of deterrence that Israel is required to take upon herself, and the burden is heavy. From this stems the need for widespread mobilization and a comprehensive strategy of building power, to include economic strengthening and aligning with defense pacts.

If the current Israeli involvement with the Palestinian track is supposed to spearhead the way towards more effective handling of the Iranian issue by the international community – it may indeed prove effective. But if it is not intended towards this end, it may divert the bulk of the effort to a secondary front away from the main struggle.