Channels
Photo: Yariv Katz
Guy Bechor
Photo: Yariv Katz

Time for disengagement

After restoring its deterrent power, Israel should consider dramatic moves

In the 1990s, we saw the process gaining steam: The more Israel advanced on the Oslo Accords front, the more conceding and submissive it was perceived in the region. The deeper we sank into the Shiite swamp in Lebanon, the weaker and more miserable we seemed. The combination of Oslo and Lebanon was lethal, but we failed to see it. We were busy celebrating the “New Middle East.”

 

Gradually, our enemies got the sense that they have the strength to defeat Israel: Terror groups attacked us ceaselessly and thousands of Israelis, both soldiers and civilians, lost their lives. Yet we failed to grasp the link between the three focal points of terrorism: Judea and Samaria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip. We adopted different policies on each front, our thinking was different on each front, and we assigned different officials to handle each front.

 

In the past decade we fought three wars (Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, the Second Lebanon War in 2006, and most recently Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip.) These wars in fact constituted one war: A war meant to repair the damages of the Oslo and Lebanon years.

 

Had we realized this is in fact one war, we could have handled this wave in a more comprehensive and less tormented manner. For years we tormented ourselves with moral dilemmas and odd commissions of inquiry, when we were in fact dealing with one war featuring the same origins and rules: Strength and weakness.

 

The damage had been repaired only towards the end of this decade. Israel’s deterrent power had been restored. Fatah, Hamas, and Hezbollah are uninterested in a new war against the IDF. Israel is no longer perceived to be submissive or conceding. The balloons inflated here in the past 20 years were completely deflated: Hamas, Hezbollah, and Hamas shrunk and reassumed their original dimensions: Not-too-important organizations, which were inflated due to their struggle against Israel.

 

As they find it difficult to bridge the gap between what they created and the harsh reality, they seek refuge in lies and delusions. The lies of the “Jenin massacre,” the Hezbollah “victory” that wasn’t, and Hamas’ bogus triumphs. Yet everyone in the Middle East knows who the strong party is. It was proven in three wars; that is, in one war.

 

Dilemma is back

Everyone realizes it, except for us. How strange indeed: During the years of threat and danger we celebrated the new Middle East; we were euphoric. Yet during the years of teaching terror groups a lesson, we were depressed. Our reactions were wholly incommensurate with the reality around us.

 

In the 1990s we thought we were strong, yet in fact we conveyed a sense of weakness and lack of deterrence. Since 2000 we’ve been thinking that we’re weak, while we in fact convey an immense sense of deterrence.

 

Now, the dilemma is back: Diplomatic negotiations portray us as weak and submissive and invite a blow, as in this region the weak is attacked. However, we stand our ground, we win, and then the Arab world says: Well, let’s negotiate with them. And we do that, only to again be perceived as submissive and weak. So what can we do in order to end this vicious cycle?

 

The solution is to avoid the ends of the spectrum: We should stay away from negotiations on the one hand, and from confrontation and war on the other hand. We have no interest in either of them. The only way that will work is the way of disengagement.

 

It worked in Lebanon, it’s working in Gaza, and it has to work in Judea and Samaria. Negotiations won’t work, because the Palestinians will drown us with the issues of Jerusalem, the refugees, and whatnot.

They will tie us and the future of our children to their own existential dilemmas. Only disengagement will salvage us from them and from their tormented world.

 

The time is right for a dramatic initiative by the Israeli government. For example, disengaging from Jerusalem’s Arab neighborhoods, with the exception of the Old City. A total of 250,000 Palestinians, who for some reason became Israeli Arabs, will go back to the Palestinian Authority. Nobody in the world will object to this: In fact, they will cheer us on. Meanwhile, we will save billions of shekels in welfare payments and secure an achievement that includes neither negotiations nor war, but rather, only detachment.

 


פרסום ראשון: 07.19.09, 23:58
 new comment
Warning:
This will delete your current comment