Terrorism in the US. September 11, 2001
Photo: AP
Is terror returning to America?
Domestic threat level rising in US, but so are counter-terror capabilities
While displaying impressive intelligence and counter-terror capabilities, 2009 has been characterized by a significant rise in the quality and number of intentions to carry out attacks on American soil.
More than eight years have passed since the collapse of the Twin Towers, and the sense among many intelligence communities worldwide is that the al-Qaeda organization is unable to repeat the scope of “operational success” it achieved in that historic attack.
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However, in September of this year authorities uncovered the most significant terror plot in the US since September 11th, when a coffee cart operator from south Manhattan who immigrated with his family from Afghanistan was detained after apparently operating on behalf of al-Qaeda’s global terror unit. His computer was found to contain information about potential countries in America.
The detainee, Najibullah Zazi, combined several elements that distinguish him from other affairs. He did not make do with inspiration from online terror manuals, but rather, undertook the most important “leap” in the world of Global Jihad in the form of a trip to Pakistan, where he was trained at al-Qaeda camps and met with senior group members.
Zazi managed to bring together more activists in New York and Denver, some of whom are yet to be detained. They purchased materials used in the preparation of explosive devices and even experimented with them.
However, the “Zazi case” is not the only one. Online magazine The Long War Journal reported that in the past year alone, more than 10 terror cells had been uncovered across the US; we can assume that the number of cells yet to be uncovered is similar.
In May 2009, authorities detained four suspects after they placed explosive devices at the entrance to a New York City synagogue. Fortunately, these were dummy bombs, supplied to cell activists by an FBI agent posing as a member of Pakistani group Jaish-e-Muhammad.
In July, authorities arrested eight suspects in North Carlina who planned to carry out an attack in an America army base. Upon the uncovering of this cell, officials discovered that about two years earlier, four of its members attempted to reach Tel Aviv, yet their entrance was prevented at Ben-Gurion Airport and they were sent back to the US.
The cells that were uncovered are among the various “operational arms” of Global Jihad: on one end of the scale we see cells referred to as “Core al-Qaeda,” which are guided by the organizations global terror unit. They possess highly developed capabilities and warrant special attention.
On the other end of the scale we see independent cells that operated without direct links to al-Qaeda. These people undergo a local radicalization process and are exposed to Jihadist propaganda at mosques and online. Such cells are more difficult to identify, but they also possess more limited capabilities, as they are not premised on orderly military training.
Between the two ends of the scale we see the “mid-level” cells, which acted mostly independently, yet maintained limited ties with groups abroad and at times took part in training sessions and fighting in “Jihad fronts” such as Somalia and Pakistan.
Many of the cells exposed comprised American citizens who were Christian or members of other faiths before converting to Islam and undergoing religious radicalization. Such elements are considered particularly problematic for security service as result of the difficulty in identifying them on time.
Alongside the converts, most activists detained as of late were immigrants from Muslim states. As opposed to the September 11th attackers, who arrived in the US from abroad for the purpose of carrying out the attack, these immigrants reside in the US permanently, enjoy freedom of movement from and to it, and constitute a population group that may be ripe for Global Jihad recruitment and influence.
Increased threat, increased capability
However, alongside the pessimistic data, we see one prominent ray of light – the US has been showing upgraded intelligence and anti-terrorism capabilities mostly in respect to its ability penetrate terror cells via technological means and agents.Beyond the gathering of intelligence in order to thwart attacks, there is great significance in the US in bringing suspects to justice. In many past cases, terror suspects were released quickly due to absence of incriminating evidence that stemmed from arrest at early stages of planning. This constraint prompted the FBI to adopt a different modus operand that is more creative and bolder (some will say that it is almost dangerous and not desirable.)
And so, authorities detained Husein Smadi after he attempted to detonate a car bomb near a Dallas skyscraper. The young Jordanian was unaware that the vehicle he received from an undercover agent did not contain explosives. In another case, Authorities detained Michael Finton after he too attempted to detonate a car bomb outside a courthouse; he believed the car contained a huge amount of explosives.
These examples reflect a more active intelligence approach that is reminiscent of some of the Shin Bet’s methods and has proven itself thus far. We can only image what would have taken place had the suppliers of the car bombs been authentic al-Qaeda activists rather than undercover agents.
On the other hand, this modus operandi is not free of criticism, and some argue that the FBI is acting aggressively, in a manner that “pushes youngsters into action,” thereby creating terror cells that would unlikely acquire operational capabilities on their own.
One way or another, it appears that American intelligence agencies are investing great resources and boasting anti-terror success stories.
While the US is involved in daily and exhausting war on terror in Iraq ,Afghanistan, and other fronts, in the past year we saw growing attention to domestic threats. While al-Qaeda’s global terror unit reinforces itself and trains American and European recruits (recently we saw the first suicide attack by an American citizen in Somalia,) White House officials have good reason to keep their hand on the pulse in New York just like in Baghdad.
Elad Schaffer serves as VP at CeitiT, which offers comprehensive terror analysis and professional counseling
