According to the report summarizing the Israel Defense Forces conduct with reference to the attack at Kerem Shalom, in which Palestinian attackers killed two troops and kidnapped Cpl. Gilad Shalit, the advanced preparedness and treatment of the warning preceding the attack were good but the army exhibited tactical deficiencies during the incident itself.
The report will be presented Monday to IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz. Maj.-Gen. (Res.) Giora Eiland was appointed by Halutz to head the committee examining the incident.
The main findings presented in the report focus on the army’s operations following the attackers’ infiltration into Israel. One of the central questions in the affair arose immediately after it happened: Did the IDF properly prepare following the warning issued regarding the possible attack? Did the IDF properly minimize chances of the attack being successfully perpetrated?
Acting on warnings
The Eiland report supported the findings of the initial inquiry carried out by Brigade Commander over the southern Gaza area, Colonel Avi Peled, immediately following the incident: The Southern Command was aware that a Palestinian cell was organizing an attack, and planned to infiltrate through a tunnel. “Come Quickly” was the code name it was given, and a number of preventative operations were carried out in the field in the days preceding the attack.
The army’s preparation included digging for tunnels, trackers’ searches and boosting troop presence in the area. A week earlier an elite IDF unit carried out an arrest raid of Hamas members in south Gaza to collect further information on the attack plan. The operation was led by commander of the Gaza Division, Brigadier General Aviv Kochavi, and was approved by head of the Southern Command General Yoav Galant.
Another section of the report addresses the response on the field following the infiltration by the attackers. The difficult result – two soldiers dead and one kidnapped – made the army’s advanced preparedness less relevant. The report concluded that soldiers’ response after the gunmen entered Israel was where the problems arose.
'Sometimes one soldier's mistake decides'
The report exposes deficiencies on various levels, during the roughly one-hour period from the moment the first IDF tank was hit until code “Hannibal” was declared – the procedure performed when a soldier has been kidnapped. Troops’ faulty performance during this hour resulted in the fact that all ensuing operations, including entering a few hundred meters into Gaza, were hopeless, and Shalit’s kidnappers managed to escape unhindered.
A military official familiar with the inquiry explained, “You can be excellently prepared, but sometimes a small mistake by one soldier in the field is what decides the result. Not that one or another soldier intentionally erred. It can happen at the height of a battle as well.”
The Eiland report does not contain any recommendations to adopt personal conclusions with regards to particular senior officers. In any case, Colonel Peled’s term as brigade commander and Brig.-Gen. Kochavi’s term as division commander were scheduled to end in the next few weeks.
Any personal note against them, though, could affect the future of their military careers. It is possible that recommendations would be levied against more junior officers, or it is also a possiblity Chief of Staff Halutz may not accept the report’s recommendations and will choose a different course of action.