The recent collective act of insubordination in the IDF’s Givati Brigade was not the first company-level rebellion in the military’s history.
Over the past several decades, the IDF has experienced a number of similar incidents: a Paratroopers company abandoned an outpost in Lebanon in the 1990s; Golani Brigade soldiers walked out of their base at Tze’elim in 2007; and in 2012, a group of soldiers from the 7th Armored Brigade refused orders and abandoned their assigned duties.
Givati mutiny
The leadership challenge has always been complex, particularly in veteran companies, where powerful traditions, symbols and internal norms can collide with formal military orders.
Yet the Givati incident cannot be dismissed with a shrug and the biblical observation that “there is nothing new under the sun.”
Doing so would be an exercise in dangerously narrow thinking. It would miss the larger and far more troubling picture: an army being ground down by the longest war in Israel’s history.
Ignoring the dimension of time
David Ben-Gurion emerged from the War of Independence with a critical principle for Israel’s national security doctrine: Israel must avoid prolonged wars.
The reasons were clear. Long wars erode international legitimacy and consume national resources, foremost among them manpower.
After the October 7 massacre, however, the prime minister declared that there would be no time limit on achieving the war’s objectives. Israel entered a prolonged campaign while disregarding that foundational consideration, the dimension of time.
Nearly three years have passed.
The ground forces, cut back and neglected over three decades, were not expanded. The enormous burden placed on combat units is now taking a visible toll.
At the end of World War II, a groundbreaking U.S. military study reached an unequivocal conclusion: Units engaged in continuous combat for more than 60 days experience severe deterioration in discipline and become dangerous to themselves.
The IDF’s operational learning apparatus circulated that research among senior commanders as early as December 2023. The document caused an uproar and was shelved.
Its warnings have since materialized repeatedly.
The loss of the courage to command
The Givati rebellion is a painful symptom of an army suffering from low standards, weakened discipline and moral and ethical erosion.
That deterioration is not caused only by the length of the war. It reflects an even deeper problem: a crisis of command.
Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage’s classic book Crisis in Command, which examines the collapse of the U.S. Army’s ground forces in Vietnam, is more relevant than ever, even though the causes of Israel’s crisis are different.
American commanders in Vietnam were accused of leading from the rear.
IDF commanders lead courageously from the front, fighting alongside their soldiers and setting a personal example.
Their problem today is different: They have lost the courage to command.
Apart from professionalism and personal example, the willingness to establish boundaries and enforce red lines is the most important quality a commander can possess.
Since October 7, the IDF’s senior command has struggled to do so for three principal reasons.
The first is the shadow of the October 7 failure.
Guilt over the catastrophe, reinforced by poisonous conspiracy theories and accusations of betrayal, paralyzed the senior command. Commanders became reluctant to restrain junior ranks in the field, even when unacceptable norms were justified in the name of “fighting the war.”
The second is the equation that says society loves the soldiers but hates the officers.
This narrative took root during the Elor Azaria affair and has since gained dangerous influence. Senior officers, particularly the IDF chief of staff, are attacked and humiliated daily by politicians and media outlets, while the political leadership fails to defend them.
That campaign carries a heavy internal military cost.
The third factor is the reversal of operational experience.
For the first time in IDF history, many junior commanders, from brigade level downward, and ordinary combat soldiers now possess more direct battlefield experience than much of the General Staff and senior command.
Under such conditions, it becomes far more difficult for senior officers to impose severe disciplinary measures on soldiers who have endured experiences the officers themselves have not.
A revolution, not new orders
The IDF leadership is aware of the crisis.
It was recently reported that the chief of staff ordered the drafting of a new foundational document intended to renew military discipline and values.
Unfortunately, like earlier committees and initiatives, including the committee headed by Maj. Gen. Moti Baruch under the previous chief of staff, this document will not produce the necessary change.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Guy HazutPhoto: Amos LuzanAs long as the war continues, and as long as Israeli society and the IDF remain inside a living and active trauma, post-traumatic damage cannot truly be treated.
When the guns finally fall silent, the IDF will need far more than foundational documents or cosmetic reforms. It will require a genuine revolution.
That revolution must begin with a deep and honest investigation, one that has yet to take place.
It must examine not only battlefield tactics, but the core of the IDF’s organizational culture: its discipline, values, standards and command norms.
The Givati incident is therefore not merely a local disciplinary affair. It is a warning.
An army can absorb occasional acts of insubordination. It cannot indefinitely withstand exhausted units, eroding standards and commanders who no longer feel able to draw a line.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Guy Hazut is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and former head of the IDF Ground Forces’ operational learning apparatus