In March 2024, when commanders in Northern Command concluded that the drone threat was not a minor nuisance but a battlefield-shaping development, the military established an advanced drone school.
The initiative was led by about 60 reserve soldiers with drone expertise, including instructors who had previously served at the school. They said they initially believed the effort would be temporary, but that the system did not adapt quickly enough.
An experimental IDF drone
In recent days, soldiers have been repeatedly wounded in incidents involving explosive drones. Earlier, soldier Liem Ben Hamo was killed in such an attack.
The military is now reassessing its approach to drone warfare, saying a broader system is needed to integrate defensive technologies and operational responses. Until the war, responsibility for the issue largely sat within the Border Defense Corps, but officials say that structure did not adequately advance counter-drone capabilities.
The primary threat in the north and along the border with Lebanon is the fiber-optic FPV drone used by Hezbollah, a system described by officials as simple but highly lethal.
The drone is connected to its operator via a thin fiber-optic cable that spools out during flight, allowing it to maneuver without breaking contact. Because it does not rely on radio frequency signals, it is largely immune to electronic warfare systems and is difficult to detect using conventional counter-drone tools.
Military officials said traditional jamming and interception systems are ineffective against it.
“When you see a drone entering a post where there is no apparent communication signal, you immediately understand it is fiber-optic,” one military source said.
Officials said the system is relatively inexpensive, costing about 2,000 shekels ($500 to $600) for a basic unit, compared with far more expensive anti-tank missiles previously used by Hezbollah.
Officials said the terrorist group has increasingly shifted toward these drones, which can be deployed at longer ranges than some guided missiles and are harder to detect.
The group has also drawn lessons from the war in Ukraine, where forces have adapted by using acoustic sensors and artificial intelligence systems to detect the sound signature of drones.
Reservists have proposed improvised countermeasures, including metal wires designed to sever fiber-optic lines and bring drones down. Similar methods have been used in Ukraine, officials said.
Troops on the ground have also installed makeshift protective netting over vehicles and positions, using donated materials and volunteer welders to construct frameworks. One source said the netting has proven partially effective but is not a complete solution.
A security official said that despite temporary disruptions to the terrorist group’s operations in recent months, no comprehensive technological or passive defense system was fully deployed during the available time window.
“There was knowledge of the problem for a long time, but no systemic solution was implemented at the required scale,” the official said.
Former instructors also pointed to gaps in training and awareness among soldiers. In one case, a soldier reportedly picked up an explosive drone from the ground and threw it away without realizing the danger, narrowly avoiding injury.
“There is a serious awareness gap,” one former instructor said. “Soldiers must understand this threat. Netting is not an ideal solution, and this situation should not have been reached.”