The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was not the result of a carefully planned revolution, but of a moment of hesitation. East German official Günter Schabowski, asked when new travel regulations would take effect, replied mistakenly that they were valid “immediately.” Crowds surged toward the border, guards stood down and the regime collapsed.
The episode illustrates a broader historical lesson: authoritarian systems often fall not when opposition peaks, but when those tasked with defending the system lose the will to act. Israeli historian Uriya Shavit has noted that regimes collapse when their supporters and guardians conclude that the cost of enforcing obedience exceeds the cost of disobedience.
Protests in Iran
That lesson resonates as Iran confronts its most sustained wave of protests in years.
The unrest has exposed growing unease not only among critics of the Islamic Republic, but also within conservative and hard-line circles that traditionally form the backbone of the regime. Over the past year, voices from within Iran’s radical camp have openly criticized what they view as weakness by state institutions in managing both domestic and regional challenges.
Since late 2024, such criticism has focused on Tehran’s softer enforcement of Islamic dress codes, Iran’s setbacks in Syria following the collapse of President Bashar Assad’s rule and its decision not to respond militarily to Israel’s Oct. 26, 2024, strike. In December, after Iran’s Supreme National Security Council froze implementation of a law imposing harsh penalties on women who violate hijab rules, conservative commentator Fouad Izadi warned that the regime risked losing the loyalty of religious youth if it failed to preserve its Islamic identity.
That loyalty is central to the regime’s survival. The willingness of young, ideologically motivated supporters to serve and fight underpins the effectiveness of Iran’s security forces. If identification with the system weakens, motivation to defend it could erode, as occurred in Syria when parts of the army ceased fighting for Assad.
While such doubts did not threaten the regime during periods of relative stability, they take on greater significance in moments of crisis. After Assad’s fall in December 2024, regime critic Shahin Tahmasebi warned that skepticism toward Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard could spread even among loyalists. He argued that another major shock — such as a failed Iranian strike on Israel or a renewed Israeli attack on Iran — could shatter the leadership’s image of strength and the perception of the Guard’s invincibility.
The protest wave gripping Iran over the past two weeks has renewed focus on the balance of power between the regime and its opponents. Iran faces deep structural pressures, including prolonged economic hardship, social change and recurring unrest dating back to late 2017. Yet the system has endured by relying on three pillars: effective coercive power, loyalty from the security apparatus led by the Revolutionary Guard and cohesion within the ruling elite despite internal disagreements.
Recent developments are testing those foundations.
Political change in Iran depends not only on the number of protesters or the persistence of demonstrations, but on the regime’s determination to use force. Tehran now faces a particularly acute dilemma. One option is to placate public anger through economic concessions and limited political flexibility, raising hopes of sanctions relief. But the leadership shows little appetite for compromise, and its ability to deliver meaningful economic benefits is constrained by a severe budget deficit.
The alternative is a return to full-scale repression, even at the cost of high casualties. That course would risk deepening internal fractures and increasing the likelihood of U.S. intervention, following repeated warnings by President Donald Trump that Washington would not tolerate mass bloodshed.
Dr. Raz ZimmtFor now, attention is focused on whether the cracks that have appeared over the past year within the regime’s hard core will widen further — eroding the resolve of parts of the security forces and amplifying doubts within the conservative establishment, particularly in light of Khamenei’s advanced age and visible frailty.
If that happens, the balance could shift — not necessarily toward immediate regime collapse, but toward a political turning point whose contours and consequences for Iran, and for the region, remain uncertain.
Dr. Raz Zimmt is head of the Iran and Shiite Axis Program at the Institute for National Security Studies and an Iran specialist at Tel Aviv University.