The IDF Intelligence Directorate’s investigations into the October 7 disaster miss the mark and, worse, reveal that the directorate remains entrenched in the very mindset that could lead to another catastrophe. Internal investigations conducted by the Intelligence Directorate regarding the failures of October 7 supposedly uncovered the roots of the intelligence practices under which Hamas was able to strike Israel so severely. An untrained reader might conclude that the investigation was thorough and uncompromising and achieved its objectives.
Among the findings, it was determined that there was no negligence or dereliction of duty by any personnel in the directorate, including on the night leading up to the invasion. I too believe this, but herein lies the problem: the conclusions allegedly drawn by the directorate demonstrate how deeply it remains entrenched in its conceptual framework regarding its core identity.
The Intelligence Directorate is not merely a research institute. It is not the INSS (Institute for National Security Studies), which can remain in the theoretical realm. It is an entity responsible for safeguarding the nation’s survival, and a true and fundamental correction requires a much deeper and more profound path than the conclusions reached in the investigation.
The investigation’s conclusions include, among other things, recommendations to enable greater diversity of opinions within the directorate, foster criticism, deepen understanding of the adversary, and more. However, it should not have taken the massacre of thousands and the abduction of hundreds for these conclusions to be reached, just as the surprise attack on Yom Kippur of 1973 did not need to happen for similar conclusions to have been drawn back then.
Shortly afterward, mechanisms of oversight were established, and intelligence pluralism was institutionalized through overlapping research efforts across intelligence agencies. While Israel’s operational intelligence continues to reach new heights, as was evident in the pager operation targeting Hezbollah back in September, assessment intelligence continues to fail repeatedly—even after October 7.
The problem is not in understanding what is not working. The question regarding assessment intelligence, which has failed time and again, should be: why does it not work? One of the investigation’s conclusions was that at least two officers in the Intelligence Directorate were deemed unfit for their roles. I contend that this applies to far more than just two.
The basic insight pointing to the need for diversity of opinions, criticism, and avoidance of groupthink must be achieved by embedding what is referred to as "civil courage" among all members of the intelligence community. This is the true courage to stand by professional truth, express dissenting opinions, and persist even when it is difficult. This kind of courage is exemplified by Sergeant V from Unit 8200, and if there were 20 more like her, it is reasonable to assume we would be in a different place.
If a few more bold "black sheep" like V — individuals who dedicate time to deeply studying Arab and Islamic culture and refuse to succumb to groupthink — had challenged the shepherd who strives for herd cohesion, the outcomes might have been different. Actions of people like Sergeant V should be taught in intelligence courses and case studies, just as acts of heroism in the combat field are. Another conclusion of the investigation points to a lack of understanding of radical Islamic culture.
I would amplify this conclusion further, as well as the means to address it. This is a difficult topic to address briefly, but the majority of those engaged in intelligence assessment simply do not truly know or understand the enemy — neither the Arab adversary nor the Iranian one. It is obvious that more individuals proficient in the enemy’s language, religion and culture are needed.
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However, a sterile, laboratory-like mastery of these topics, as is currently being developed in the directorate, is even more dangerous. It gives its practitioners the false sense that they possess the "shortcut" to understanding the adversary’s mentality and thought processes. It is far simpler to teach intelligence to someone who understands the culture of the streets than to teach the culture of the streets to someone who already knows intelligence.
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A Hamas terrorist during the October 7 massacre at the music festival in Re'im
(Photo: Courtesy)
Indeed, there is no need for intelligence officers to undergo extensive cultural immersion courses. However, the required pluralism can and should be achieved by diversifying the pool of candidates for intelligence assessment roles starting tomorrow morning. For example: integrating significantly more Druze intelligence officers, personnel from Unit 504, inter-organizational transfers of field agents from Shin Bet or Mossad into the Intelligence Directorate (and not just the other way around).
Also, recruiting more people from peripheral areas where individuals often have an intuitive understanding of the Arab mindset, even without language proficiency. Adopting a humble approach would reveal that it is much easier to teach intelligence to someone who understands grassroots culture than to teach grassroots culture to someone who is already well-versed in intelligence. The third and most critical pillar for intelligence personnel is the ability to imagine.
All the investigations point to this, but they do not name it explicitly or propose ways to address it. October 7, beyond being a severe intelligence failure, represents a colossal failure in the imagination of intelligence research personnel tasked with assessment and forecasting. An operational initiative like the aforementioned pagers, is made possible only through extraordinary imagination — the ability to create reality out of nothing.
Tragically, October 7 was also made possible by Hamas’ ability to imagine the worst possible scenario for Israel. They taught us this lesson in the most terrible way. If we do not deepen our understanding and draw critical conclusions, we may find ourselves, heaven forbid, once again wondering how such a disaster could happen. The freshly-minted IDF Chief of Staff, Eyal Zamir, would do well to challenge the conclusions and not accept them as they are.
- Yariv Inbar is a Military Intelligence Directorate veteran and author of the book "Operation Bethlehem: A Mossad Espionage Novel"