The goal is sacred, but the numbers are hard to grasp: 736 prisoners and security detainees and another 1,167 Gazans held in Israel were released from prison as part of the current hostage deal.
Now Israel's security establishment is debating whether they should be deported to Gaza, the West Bank or be exiled abroad. How can Israel keep a close eye on them? What if they return to engage in terrorism (and some of them certainly will)? What if Israel needs to carry out hits on top terrorists who are released to Turkey or Qatar? But most of all, there is one big concern about releasing another potential Yahya Sinwar.
November 25, 2023, the second day of the first hostage deal, was a day of joy and excitement in Israel, as 13 Israeli hostages were released after 50 days in Hamas captivity. Among them were also small children, like Emily Hand, Ohad Munder and Yahel Shoham, and the pictures of all the returned hostages, embraced by their families, were a silver lining in dark days.
But it was also a celebration day for Tarek Daoud, whose record at the age of 18 included a host of security offenses, for which he was arrested, convicted and detained in Israeli prison.
Then the news received at his home in Qalqilya was that Daoud had been included in the lists of prisoners slated to be released as part of the hostage deal with Hamas. He was neither a prominent nor prolific terrorist, nor did he make the headlines in Israel. He was just another name added to the list of 39 terrorists—which this time included mostly female terrorists—to be set free.
Shortly after his release, the security establishment received indications that Daoud had once again joined Hamas terrorists in the West Bank and returned to terrorist activity. The Shin Bet and the IDF attempted to arrest him several times, raided his home, and according to a Palestinian report, also arrested his brother in the hope to exert pressure on Daoud so he would turn himself in. This did not help. The released terrorist went underground and became wanted.
On August 12, 2024, a 60-year-old Israeli man took his car to be serviced in the West Bank city of Qalqilya. A member of Daoud's terrorist group who was in the car repair shop at the time called Daoud, informing him that an Israeli was there. The armed Daoud rushed to the scene, recognized the Israeli and opened fire at him, seriously wounding the Israeli and injuring two Palestinians who were also in the vicinity. Daoud was pursued by IDF troops outside Qalqiliya as he attempted to flee the city and was ultimately eliminated by Col. Netanel Shamaka, commander of the Efraim Regional Brigade, who led the pursuit.
Daoud was the first terrorist released in the first hostage deal to be eliminated, but certainly not the last: that same month, another freed terrorist, Wael Masha, was killed after trying to harm IDF troops. Shortly after, a third released terrorist, Jibril Jibril, was eliminated. All this happened just nine months after their release from Israeli prison.
Terrorists like Daoud and his colleagues are the new-old "headache" of the Israeli security establishment. Many of the terrorists released in previous deals have returned to engage in terrorism. How many exactly? The figure is disputed. Last June, Advocate Lt. Col. (res.) Maurice Hirsch, formerly director of the Military Prosecution in the West Bank, said that 55-60% of released terrorists return to terrorist activity.
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Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar presented to Security Cabinet ministers even harsher data, stating that "82% of those released in the Gilad Shalit deal in 2011 returned to terrorism."
Lior Akerman, a former senior Shin Bet official, claims that the numbers are much lower, claiming that "only 12% of released prisoners actually engage in planning and executing terror attacks. All the rest reflect the number of released prisoners who remain in contact with their terror groups and receive stipends or compensation or are active at the level of spreading messages and the like. Historically, there have been scarce cases of terrorist operatives returning to prominent activity, like Yahya Sinwar."
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Palestinian prisoners released into Gaza as part of the cease-fire deal
(Photo: REUTERS/Hatem Khaled , AP Photo/Jehad Alshrafi)
Either way, this is a significant addition to the number of terrorists, some of whom are experienced, whose time in prison enhanced their reputation and authority, who return to terrorism. Of the approximately 240 prisoners released in the first hostage deal in November-December 2023, 30 have already been rearrested, not including the three who were eliminated.
With the conclusion of the first phase of the current deal, which saw the release of 33 Israeli captives in exchange for the release of 736 convicted terrorists or detainees. Besides them, 1,167 detained Gazans who did not participate in the October 7 massacre were also freed.
According to a government decision, 47 Palestinians released in the current deal had already been released in the 2011 deal for the release of captive IDF soldier Gilad Shalit but returned to terrorism and were re-arrested. No one deludes themselves that any of them have become Zionists all of a sudden.
"The Palestinians are motivated by messianic ideology and persuasion," says Shalom Ben Hanan, a former senior Shin Bet official. "All those who return to terrorism believe that this is what needs to be done. They did not change their minds in prison. From their perspective, the State of Israel is still a glitch."
Israel's defense establishment is firmly supportive of hostage deals. but at the same time, there are debates about the way Israel should deal with freed prisoners.
In recent weeks, we have spoken with former senior Mossad and Shin Bet officials, who have spent quite a few hours with released security prisoners, asking them the difficult questions: Where should the freed prisoners go? Will it be effective to deport them abroad? How can Israel keep a close eye on them? And what should Israel do if they return to terrorism?
Arik Barbing, known as "Harris," is a former Shin Bet division head who previously led the Jerusalem and West Bank Region and served as head of the agency’s Cyber Division. "Since my early days as a coordinator," he said this week, "I've dealt with the most dangerous and ruthless prisoners we've had."
The three terrorists from the previous deal were eliminated nine months after their release. Is that the time it takes them to return to terrorism?
"From our experience with the Gilad Shalit deal, it takes them about a year to get a clear picture of the situation. At first, if they are tasked with a mission, they will check that they are not being fooled by the Shin Bet. Secondly, as they are still reluctant to go back to prison, they will be more cautious. That's why they will not talk on the phone, and they will keep a low profile, trying to avoid falling into a trap. But since they have no other job in life, and in prison they only grow stronger and get to know each other better – recidivism will happen."
Should they be deported abroad or sent to the West Bank?
At the time of the Gilad Shalit swap deal, Shalom Ben Hanan served as the head of the Hebron desk at the Shin Bet; he examined with his colleagues the 1,027 names that were to be exchanged for Shalit, including that of Yahya Sinwar.
"The released terrorists who are sent to the West Bank, return to their neighborhoods, welcomed by their families and embraced by members of the organization to which they belong. If they are Fatah prisoners, many of them will be directed to work, real or fictitious, within the Palestinian Authority (PA). In addition, they will be provided with subsidies for their studies and other rewards, especially if they are senior in their status."
How is seniority determined?
"Seniority depends on the length of imprisonment, the severity of the act committed and the prisoner's status at the organization before the imprisonment," says Harris.
How much money does such a prisoner receive?
"There are bonuses and there is a salary. Every released prisoner receives a grant according to the following formula: up to a five- to six-year stay in prison, 5,000-7,000 shekels ($1,400-$2,000). Senior prisoners who have spent about ten years in prison will receive a grant of 12,000 shekels ($3,400), consisting of PA funds and Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) funds. Those who are sentenced to life imprisonment or longer periods are liable to a grant of 20,000 shekels ($5,600), also from PA funds and organization funds.
"Then, as a salary, a prisoner released after serving a life sentence will receive up to 8,000 shekels ($2,200), a prisoner who served five to seven years, will get about 5,000 shekels ($1,400), but this salary may vary because released prisoners are at the risk of getting killed. That's a lot of money for someone who lives in the West Bank."
And what happens to a Hamas prisoner who returns to Gaza?
"Even in that case, they will receive some kind of reward from the PA because every prisoner is considered as someone who sacrificed something for the benefit of the Palestinian people, but they will receive full support by their organizations in Gaza.
"Generally, the PA does not finance Hamas' released prisoners. Hamas also pays regular stipends for the period the terrorists spent in Israeli prison, so compensation is being paid both for the prisoners and their families. Hamas prisoners receive stipends according to the length of imprisonment, but currently, these payments are not guaranteed due to the destruction in Gaza coupled with Hamas' financial woes.
"However, all prisoners will receive assistance, both because of the price they paid and because the prisoners' narrative is particularly sensitive in Palestinian society. From their perspective, these are freedom fighters who paid a heavy price and should be treated very carefully."
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Celebrations in Ramallah with the release of Palestinian security prisoners as part of the 2011 Shalit deal
(Photo: Amit Shabi)
One of the serious dilemmas that the security establishment is debating is where to transport the released terrorists. There is a big difference between prisoners who are sent to the West Bank, those who are released to Gaza and those who are deported abroad. “In the Shalit swap deal, Hamas governed in Gaza, so most lifers were sent there, even if they were originally from the West Bank,” explains Ben Hanan, currently a fellow at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) and a lecturer at the MA program at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at Reichman University, specializing in Hamas and terrorism.
“Hamas took them in and gave them houses, money, jobs. In the first years, we saw pictures of them living in beautiful houses, riding horses, spending time at the beach. Later on, as they wished to maintain their terrorist activity, Hamas established the 'West Bank headquarters,' a unit based in the Gaza Strip that is responsible for planning Hamas' terror attacks against Israel within the West Bank borders.
"Hamas took advantage of the connections their operatives built in Israeli prisons in order to better plan and execute terror attacks in terms of financing, purchasing weapons and instructions.
"The clan that kidnapped and murdered the three Israeli boys in June 2014, for example, received funding from the West Bank headquarters. The headquarters did not even know what the outline of the attack was; they only knew that they were giving money for terrorist activity."
This time, Israel will not repeat the same mistake, which involved deporting prisoners originally from the West Bank to Gaza. In the Gilad Shalit deal, Israel believed that deporting West Bank prisoners to Hamas-controlled Gaza would neutralize them.
Hamas violently suppressed PA officials in Gaza. "We thought that deporting them to the Gaza Strip would prevent them from engaging in terrorism," says Harris, "but this notion blew up in our face.
"The mastermind behind the terror attack in June 2014, who provided the funding for the kidnapping and murder of the three teens, was a Hebronite who was exiled to the Gaza Strip in the Gilad Shalit exchange in November 2011.
"He was deported to Gaza, where he later carried out a terror attack. Hamas leaders saw the deported prisoners as serious operatives, and they quickly aligned with Sinwar, [Mohammed] Deif and [Marwan] Issa, launching attacks in the West Bank. They recruited Palestinians in Nablus, Ramallah and Jenin to carry out further attacks. When we alerted, there was no approval, for all sorts of reasons, to hit them in the Gaza Strip, mainly out of fear that it would cause escalation."
What about the opposite scenario of deporting Gaza terrorists to the West Bank?
"Deporting Gazans to the West Bank is the worst and most dangerous scenario, which is something you wouldn't want to do," says Harris. "The PA isn't interested in that either. They are afraid that the arrival of these Gazans, who belong mainly to Hamas and PIJ sections, would lead to radicalization. These Gazans, from the PA's perspective, could threaten the stability of their regime."
"In the 2011 Shalit deal, Saleh al-Arouri (former head of Hamas’ military wing in the West Bank who was eliminated in Beirut in the current war), as well as other terrorists, upgraded their status through the connections they have created both in the West Bank and in Hamas' external leadership in Qatar, Syria and Iraq. As time goes by, if we don't keep our eyes close on these terrorists, leading to their arrest in due course, we will face great challenges and real dangers."
According to Harris, this personal networking woven between terrorists while in Israeli prison, which they use after their release for terror purposes, is a game-changer. "The terrorists improve their position in prison in terms of the information they gain and the inter-regional connections between the West Bank and Gaza that they make," he adds. "These connections do not flourish immediately, but they are exploring the ground, and we, for our part, are keeping a close eye on them.
"Naturally, the security establishment's ability to monitor each and every one of them constantly, to the extent of revealing their intentions and goals, such as whether they intend to recruit youths, or whether they are connecting with either explosives specialists or officials in Gaza or in foreign countries, is limited."
Despite these difficulties, all the senior officials we talked to agree that surveilling released prisoners is critical. "We use wiretaps, we have aircraft monitoring them all the time," says Ilan Lotan, a former senior Shin Bet official. "It's like playing 'cat and mouse'. Part of the reason they build underground in Gaza is for fear of being monitored.
"We also use cyber, lookouts, all the available collection methods, but the experienced terrorists—and some of the freed terrorists within the swap deals are very experienced—know how to be careful and they still manage to carry out attacks. One of the lessons we should learn, for example, is to acknowledge the fact that we cannot rely mainly on technology. We need to go back to old methods, such as HUMINT (human intelligence). The Shin Bet is adapting itself to the new reality in the Gaza Strip."
"The role of the Shin Bet and the IDF," emphasizes Harris, "is to bring information about every single terrorist, certainly about those who were in Israeli prison and are swapped in deals, and to monitor their actions, i.e., who do they call, what do they do? All of this is feasible.
"In the West Bank, for example, Israel has intelligence and operational superiority, even if not hermetic. We know well everyone who is released. In addition, we need to make sure that they don't create connections, say between Hebron and Jenin or between Nablus and Ramallah, based on the connection with their inmates."
Luxurious hotels in Qatar
Another alternative, which has been tried in the past, is deporting released prisoners abroad. In the current hostage deal, the Israeli government decided that security prisoners set to be released, convicted of murder or manufacturing weapons that were used for killing, or convicted of sending terrorists to carry out an attack which involved casualties, will be released on the condition that they are transferred to Gaza or abroad and do not return to Israel or West Bank territories for three years or permanently.
If they wish to return, the released terrorists should refrain from engaging in terrorism for three years, and even then, they should get the approval of the Shin Bet and the Israeli Cabinet.
Under the current deal, most hardened terror convicts were deported to foreign countries. However, opinions within the security establishment are divided about the effectiveness of deportation abroad. On the one hand, distance makes it difficult to engage in terrorism from afar. On the other hand, if they return to terrorism, hitting them on foreign soil is much more complex than in the West Bank or even in Gaza.
Harris, who currently engages in intelligence consulting, believes exile is effective, at least for some of them. "If you exile them to Turkey or Qatar—geographical distance matters," he says. "The further away you are, the easier it is for us to identify the connection to terrorism and deal with it."
"Obviously, you can go to Ramallah every evening to arrest the same person. But as far as experts and senior leaders are concerned, I prefer them to be far away. The more distant you are, while having digital access, the more advantage we have, which we know how to exploit. This is the work of the Shin Bet, Mossad and Military Intelligence.
"If you identify an axis, a connection between a terrorist in a distant country and the West Bank, Israel and its allies have the upper hand, capable of deterring and hitting them, which may lead to deterrence. But in recent years, this has hardly happened, therefore Israel's deterrence capacity has decreased."
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Khaled Mashal. Established a complete network of terror operatives from abroad
(Photo: Osama Faisal, AP)
Oded Elam, former head of the Terrorism Division at the Mossad, holds the view that it would be preferable that most dangerous terrorists be nearby. "I think it's a mistake to exile terrorists," he says. "We know the story of Saleh al-Arouri who established a complete network of terror operatives from abroad, and the same goes for Khaled Mashal, Qatar-based Hamas leader. Our capability to deal with terrorists abroad does exist, but it is immeasurably lower than our ability in Gaza and in the West Bank."
Can terrorists from abroad return to Gaza or the West Bank without Israel's permission?
"These terrorists abroad become targets," says Ben Hanan. "They can't return to the West Bank through the Allenby Bridge crossing, nor can they pass through Ben Gurion Airport. But there have been cases in the past of terrorists who smuggled themselves into the area."
So, what can be done?
"It requires a close cooperation with Mossad. There was such cooperation in the past, and there will be again in the future. Israel has the intelligence capabilities to monitor whoever it wants."
"They are not deported to countries that are friendly to us, such as the U.S. or Europe, but rather to countries who welcome and embrace them," says Amnon Sofrin, a former senior Mossad official. "Because no one else wants to have them."
"In Turkey, for example, there is an official Hamas representative who was released in the Shalit deal, and was also the driver of the car of the Hamas cell that kidnapped the late Israeli soldier, Nachshon Waxman.
"Officials in foreign countries take care of their housing, their salaries. Saleh al-Arouri lived in Turkey first. There is an existing, active network there, which knows how to recruit people, provide them with everything they need and knows how to orchestrate terror attacks in Israel and abroad. Once the terrorists are under the auspices of another country, it is impossible to touch them."
What can be done if a prisoner deported abroad returns to terrorism?
"In terms of terrorists abroad, you should choose who to focus on. Not all senior released terrorists have the same capability, and not all are equally dangerous. Since we know who they are, we can tell who the most dangerous ones are; so, we start monitoring them, using all available means to build their profiles: who they meet, who their circle of people are and what they are planning. Then you can foil their plans.
"These terrorists have become cautious, so you have to use all your abilities to understand what kind of terror acts they can carry out. You must be very careful, because you are operating on foreign soil, and as an institution, you are the main suspect. We are constantly learning and refining our methods and capabilities, adapting them to the new reality."
Akerman, now head of National Resilience Desk in the Institute for Policy and Strategy at the Reichman University, also prefers that the freed prisoners be nearby. "As a general rule," he says, "Shin Bet prefers to keep the released prisoners near, to monitor them better. However, the political echelon preferred to exile some of them for political reasons.
"Shin Bet is capable and designed to gather intelligence and monitor all released prisoners. None of them disappear from our sight. There are intelligence capabilities to identify abnormal security behavior or a return to terrorism of any released prisoner."
"In Turkey, for example, it's tricky. In the past, terrorists were restricted or expelled due to interests vis-à-vis the Turkish government," says Ben Hanan. "Of course, today the situation is different, and it is likely that these guys will return to terrorism. No one could really complain that Erdogan doesn't supervise Hamas terrorists enough.
"It is neither realistic to complain to Qatar, Hamas' sponsor. Look, they told Qatar to expel Hamas. Have you heard of something like that happening? Certainly not. They will continue to live there in luxurious hotels. I assume that the headquarters will embrace the released prisoners, provide them with money, budgets, titles, and in the end, they will return to terrorism.
"But there was at least one case where exile did work. In April 2002, during Operation Defensive Shield, about 50 terrorists were hiding in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, holding hostages. Since it is one of the most sacred sites in Christianity, the attack made headlines abroad. Israel preferred to negotiate with the terrorists over a military operation. After 39 days, an agreement was achieved, according to which a small number of terrorists were exiled to Gaza, most of them to Cyprus, from where they went on to exile in Ireland and Spain."
"They were cut off from terrorism as a result of the strict monitoring in the countries who took them in," says Ben Hanan. "These Western European countries took them in under strict conditions because even if they sympathized with the Palestinian cause, they were not keen on having terrorists raising money and carrying out terror attacks on their soil. Neither did they want Mossad to eliminate terrorists in their countries. These terrorists were like prisoners on license."
Why not try it now?
"It worked in the case of Church of the Nativity terrorists because most of them were Fatah members, and a few were Hamas members; so, when they were sent to European countries, they integrated, and almost all of them refrained from recidivism," says Harris. "They realized that life could be better, and they got along. But now, most of the released terrorists belong to Hamas and PIJ, and less to Fatah. Moreover, it happened more than 20 years ago. Today, European countries will no longer want to take in such people."
Initiative instead of reaction
Of course, there is no way knowing in advance how many of the prisoners released in the current deal will ultimately return to terrorism. "It's a Russian roulette, maybe the released terrorists will murder, maybe not," says former MK Adv. Zvi Hauser, who served during the Gilad Shalit deal as cabinet secretary and Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee chairman, as well as chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence. "These are all estimates."
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Zvi Hauser. 'Maybe the released terrorists will murder, maybe not'
(Photo: Moshe Mizrahi)
Hauser objected to the Gilad Shalit deal. "The fact is that there are people who paid with their lives because of the Shalit deal, which means that Israel could not prevent murderous attacks. Our intelligence capabilities are good but not hermetic. We may have prevented more killings, but not all of them."
Even if we accept the low estimates that only 12% of prisoners released in the current deal will return to terrorism, we are still talking about many dozens of terrorists. In such a case, the security establishment has a variety of options to deal with them, which are also subject to the location of the terrorists. None of the options, as Hauser claims, are hermetic.
If terrorists that are sent to the West Bank or Gaza offend, they will first get a warning call from a Shin Bet official, like "We know that you met with this and that and did this and that, be careful, you are a released prisoner." But that doesn’t always help. “I sent coordinators to released prisoners and summoned them for warning calls,” says Harris. “It has the same effect as receiving a reprimand from a schoolteacher."
For terrorists deported abroad, says former Mossad official Elam, these warnings are less relevant. “Abroad, I don’t want them to think that they are being monitored. I don't want them to be alert, to switch locations or use obfuscation techniques. It's not our interest to say, ‘you are my target,' because that will make them more cautious.
"If the released prisoners repeat their terrorist activity, we will act according to their whereabouts. If they are in the West Bank, they may be declared wanted, and security forces will want to arrest them. As mentioned, about 30 of the prisoners that were released in the first deal have already been rearrested. If they are abroad, it's a bit more complicated. In a friendly country, you can ask the authorities to act. Obviously, this is not really an option that currently exists in Qatar or Turkey."
The more extreme option is a targeted assassination of the released terrorists, which is also very complex, even if the terrorists are in the West Bank or in Gaza. "After the Shalit deal, there were a few targeted assassinations in the Gaza Strip. It is at Israel's discretion," says Ben Hanan.
Is it a political decision?
"It's never solely political. It's a decision taken by the entire system. The security establishment doesn't go to government meetings, saying, 'Let's eliminate terrorists.' Until October 7, the entire system was stuck in a notion that in the name of maintaining quiet, they don't want to eliminate someone from the West Bank headquarters, for example.
"I felt that these terrorists were 'immune,' to the extent that we couldn't get even with them. Now, everyone says that things will change, but I'm skeptical. I assume West Bank operatives who remained alive will return to their pre-October 7 engagements."
Lotan believes that the political system was the factor that stopped the targeted assassinations. "Over the years," he says, "there were terror attacks in the West Bank at the instruction of Gaza leaders, and there were quite a few recommendations to strike them with a preemptive blow, recommendations that were not approved by Israel's political echelon. Before October 7, for example, Shin Bet recommended initiating action against Hamas in Gaza. Why didn't it happen? Ask the politicians."
What can be done now?
"Initiating actions, rather than reacting. Secondly, we should attack their military capabilities instead of looking for targets. If you identify any military capabilities your enemy has, like machinery for manufacturing mortar shells, you should hit it immediately. Don't wait to see if they intend to shoot or not. We have to change our perception."
"The Shin Bet mainly knows how to arrest the terrorists," says Harris. "In exceptional cases, when they face a "ticking time bomb" terrorist in the West Bank, they receive a special approval to kill him. The problem is with the system. If a freed prisoner has now returned home and is searching on the Internet 'how to make explosives,' I want to be able to reach him, legally, from the moment I identify his terroristic intention or thoughts."
And this is not what's happening?
"In the past, after they were released, the security establishment would treat them as if their past activity had been cleared, and that was wrong. If I'm releasing prisoners ahead of time within an exchange deal and they commit the slightest infraction, I want to have a legal framework that will allow me to arrest them, track them, etc.; it should be a faster framework than with another West Bank resident who was not released in a deal.
"This framework did not exist in the Shalit deal. Released prisoners returned to terrorism, and each time, we had to start over. But these are not new terrorists; they were released in a deal, they were spared seven years of prison, and I want us to treat them as released terrorists. We need to have sharper and faster mechanisms, and closer security coordination in dealing with and that we and the PA have in common."
"The targeted killing of released prisoners on foreign soil is much more complicated. Taking action abroad is a long and complex process, which requires a lot of resources and has political implications," says Elam. "Why haven't we eliminated the terrorists in Qatar to this day? Why do senior Hamas officials such as Khaled Mashal and Musa Abu Marzouk still sit a kilometer from the airport in Qatar? Both because of Qatar and because of the Americans. Even after the war began, we didn't touch their top leaders in Qatar. We didn't eliminate them in Turkey. As evidence, Haniyeh was sitting unharmed in Turkey until he moved to Iran and was eliminated in Tehran in July 2024 by Israel."
Maybe because it's much harder to do so in such countries.
"Israel and Mossad know how to reach their targets. It's not always possible in terms of operational or intelligence capabilities, and sometimes there are political considerations involved. But still, Mossad knows how to reach them."
"Unfortunately," says Harris, "most of those who were deported abroad and transported to countries around the world were not eliminated. Saleh al-Arouri, former head of Hamas’ military wing in the West Bank, who for a long time established terror networks, was not killed until the current war.
"I think they should be deported to as many countries as possible. Distance creates varied intelligence opportunities. Sometimes, it is easier to hit and eliminate in distant locations than in closer ones. The sense of security abroad is higher for them, and sometimes the ability to hit them abroad is more accessible."
Elam hopes this has changed now with the newly released prisoners and the ones who will follow. "It is important to understand that Israel has changed in terms of its willingness to use force," he says. "We have a completely different security perception since October 7. Israel, to a certain extent, has taken off the gloves. And we see it now in Tulkarm and Jenin, and of course in Gaza and Lebanon.
"The era of Israel calling the U.S. begging it to convince Hezbollah to move a tent is over. In Gaza or in the West Bank, too, in my opinion, there is no more 'knock on the roof' procedure (a warning of imminent bombing attacks to give the inhabitants time to flee). It's over. Terrorists who have been released in the deal should know that they will be eliminated if they return to terrorism. And that their death will occur on the ground, not through a court judgment."