Judging by the headlines, the framework agreement signed in Washington could look like a historic breakthrough on the road to peace between Israel and Lebanon. But a closer reading of the document and its implementation mechanisms shows something very different. This is not a peace agreement. It is an American attempt to create a new security reality in south Lebanon, in the hope that it will eventually become a diplomatic reality as well.
The agreement’s major achievement is not that it brings peace, but that it changes the starting point. For the first time, Israel and Lebanon have publicly signed a joint document under American sponsorship that speaks of neighborly relations, sovereignty and even future peace. The fact that the signing took place openly in Washington, rather than in a secret meeting or in a tent at Naqoura on the Israel-Lebanon border, symbolizes a deeper shift than any technical clause in the agreement.
But the gap between the declarations and the reality on the ground remains enormous. The entire agreement effectively rests on one assumption: that the Lebanese army will succeed in doing what it has failed to do for decades, disarm Hezbollah and return the monopoly on force to the state. That is also the agreement’s weak point.
Hezbollah is not party to the document. It did not take part in the negotiations, rejected the agreement immediately after it was signed and warned that any attempt to impose disarmament on it could ignite a civil war in Lebanon. In other words, the force that holds most of the military power in south Lebanon is not bound by the agreement at all.
Even if the Lebanese government wants to implement the commitments it has taken upon itself, it is still unclear whether it has the political and military ability to do so. Significant parts of Lebanon’s Shiite population view Hezbollah as the country’s “protector,” and some of the criticism in Israel and the West also focuses on whether elements within the Lebanese army itself are identified with the terror group.
One of the key differences from previous arrangements is the American role. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and earlier cease-fire agreements, there was broad international involvement, but the enforcement mechanisms proved toothless. This time, the United States is building its own monitoring mechanism, with close involvement from the American defense establishment, and wants to ensure that any Israeli withdrawal depends on real progress by the Lebanese army.
Another important change is the American commitment to help Lebanon financially with $130 million, including $100 million in humanitarian aid and $30 million to strengthen the army. That does not include training assistance. It is a significant shift, but it is still not a guarantee of success. The Americans can monitor, mediate and apply diplomatic and economic pressure, but they cannot disarm Hezbollah themselves.
For Israel, the central achievement is a change in the formula. In the past, Israel was pressured to withdraw from south Lebanon according to predetermined timetables. This time, the opposite principle has been set. The withdrawal is not automatic, but conditioned on the dismantling of the security threat. As long as Hezbollah remains armed, Israel may remain in the security zone.
From Jerusalem’s perspective, this is a significant diplomatic achievement because it establishes, for the first time, international recognition that the Israeli presence is directly linked to the security threat and not to territorial ambitions.
(Photo: IDF)
Still, Israel is also paying a price. The IDF’s freedom of action is not absolute. The agreement allows self-defense and responses to threats, but does not grant freedom to initiate large-scale operations. The meaning is that every Israeli action will also be subject to American considerations, especially against the backdrop of Washington’s efforts to prevent regional escalation and preserve channels of dialogue with Iran.
Diplomatically, one of the agreement’s clearest messages is aimed at Tehran. The document states that Lebanon is a sovereign state and that the Lebanese government is the only body authorized to use force on its territory. In doing so, it denies, at least declaratively, Hezbollah’s legitimacy to operate as a “parallel army” in Lebanon’s name.
If the agreement is implemented, it would be a strategic blow to the model Iran has built over decades. If not, it could remain a declaration alone.
In the end, this agreement will not be judged by the photographs from the signing ceremony or by the number of times the word “peace” appears in it. It will be tested by far simpler questions: Will Lebanese army soldiers actually deploy in the designated areas? Will Hezbollah agree to leave them? Will Israel begin gradual withdrawals? And above all, will south Lebanon be free of Hezbollah’s military presence in a year or two?
Until then, this is mainly an agreement that sketches a destination, not one that guarantees the road to it.
In that sense, the framework agreement is an important diplomatic achievement for Israel, the United States and Lebanon, but not yet a security achievement. Its success depends on one actor that did not sign it at all: Hezbollah. As long as the group does not accept the new rules of the game, the document signed in Washington is mainly an ambitious framework whose success will rise or fall on the reality on the ground.