To mark 25 years since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the CIA on Friday released 69 classified intelligence documents presented to Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush in the years leading up to the terrorist attacks. The release includes a Sept. 10, 1998, intelligence report containing a warning that al-Qaeda “may fly an explosive airplane into a U.S. city.”
The newly released documents contain no dramatic new revelations and reinforce the findings of the 2004 9/11 Commission. But one key issue raised by the files is the extent to which the intelligence reached the leaders themselves. The commission noted that intelligence about al-Qaeda’s intention to use an explosives-laden aircraft had been picked up by the intelligence community, but it was never clearly established whether that specific report reached the president directly.
Both Clinton and Bush told the commission that they understood the magnitude of the threat posed by Osama bin Laden. But commission members concluded in their final report: “We do not believe they fully understood just how many people al-Qaeda might kill, and how quickly it could do so.”
CIA Director John Ratlcliffe said upon the documents’ release: “Twenty-five years ago, the 9/11 attacks struck a blow to our nation, but they did not break us. Generations of C.I.A. officers have since dedicated their careers to securing justice for our fallen Americans and ensuring Al Qaeda would never again harm our country.”
'[They did not] fully understand just how many people al-Qaeda might kill.' President Bush
(Photo: Gene J. Puskar/AP)
There were concerns about 'warning fatigue.' President Clinton
(Photo: AP)
An analysis of the newly released documents shows that U.S. intelligence provided consistent warnings about bin Laden’s intentions but failed to assess the scale of the planned attack. The CIA noted that its human intelligence collection during those years was less than optimal. At the same time, the frequency of vague reports raised concerns about “warning fatigue” among decision-makers. An Aug. 3, 1999, document even examined the possibility that the numerous reports concerning different targets were intended to mislead the United States, a view also supported at the time by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
The timeline of presidential intelligence briefings shows how threats surfaced and then disappeared. In July 1998, five weeks before the bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa, a report detailed the organization’s intentions to strike the United States and assessed those ambitions as “plausible.” On July 24, 2001, intelligence officials reported that a planned attack had been postponed for the second consecutive time.
On Aug. 28, 2001, just two weeks before the disaster, a briefing cited threats of assassination, kidnapping, rocket attacks and the use of chemical or biological weapons, but made no mention of an attack on U.S. soil or the use of aircraft. The report stated that “inexperienced couriers or suicide bombers also make mistakes that expose plot.”
The intelligence failures led to a reorganization. CIA Director John Ratlcliffe
(Photo: REUTERS/Evan Vucci)
Following the intelligence failures and the lack of information sharing between the CIA and FBI, the U.S. national security apparatus was reorganized, including the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Former 9/11 Commission member Jamie Gorelick said the newly released documents “are consistent with the commission’s assessment of the preattack intelligence.”
At 4 a.m. on Sept. 12, 2001, just hours after the towers collapsed, CIA analysts submitted an updated situation report to the White House, written in a routine, detached tone. The document contained no emotional language, expressions of anger or dramatic phrasing. Its authors presented the president with a dispassionate picture of events as they unfolded, just as they would in any other intelligence event.
They adhered to the classic intelligence format, providing only bare facts, verified reports and data. It is perhaps the starkest example of the gulf between the magnitude of the disaster and the national shock it caused, and the intelligence community’s methodical approach.