Maj. Kobi (not his real name) is one of the Israeli Air Force’s most skilled F-15 technicians. Though still relatively young, he has a long track record of deep overhauls on these aging fighter jets, which over the years have become the air force’s strategic bombers. In recent months, the IAF Equipment Directorate assigned him to shift from routine maintenance to a series of long-term upgrade treatments—without informing him the jets he was servicing were being readied to strike the country where he was born.
“When we told him, after the planes had already hit nuclear and ballistic missile sites in Iran, his eyes welled up,” a senior IAF officer said. “Two days later, he opened up and told us about his childhood in Iran—the antisemitism, the beatings for being Jewish. Later we found another female technician with a similar story. Like many in the technical corps, they walked around the base with pride—they had done the impossible. They made 40- to-60-year-old jets and helicopters ready for the most distant, complex, and dangerous operation the Israeli Air Force has ever undertaken.”
An aging fleet, a tight timeline
Operation Rising Lion caught the air force at a difficult time. Had they waited two or three more years, most pilots would have flown to Iran in some of the world’s most advanced jets. Only recently—five years late due to repeated elections and postponed budget approvals—Israel began acquiring replacements for its outdated fleet. Aside from UAVs and one and a half F-35 squadrons (still not fully delivered), most of the fleet remains antiquated by Western standards: older-model F-16s and F-15s, Boeing 707-based refuelers, vintage Hercules transports, and Sikorsky Yasur helicopters (AKA CH-53 Sea Stallion) dating back to Entebbe.
Unlike Israel, Western militaries—facing fewer threats—operate newer, more efficient, and easier-to-maintain aircraft. Yet it was in this context that Air Force Chief Tomer Bar made two seemingly science-fiction demands 10 months ago:
- Secure full operational freedom over Tehran to strike targets directly above the city, avoiding the use of more expensive standoff munitions.
- Ensure that not a single aircraft, especially manned ones, would crash or be shot down over enemy territory.
“We trained, simulated, debated and coordinated with the full expectation that at least one jet would be lost over Iran—due to either a technical issue or enemy fire,” an officer said. “That was more than a realistic scenario, even with our newest aircraft—let alone these.”
Sealed contingency letters were prepared in advance and kept in drawers. “Remember, less than two years ago, we couldn’t even fly freely over Lebanon due to Hezbollah’s 100 Iranian-aided anti-air batteries,” he added. “Now imagine sending hundreds of aircraft on thousands of sorties into Iran’s airspace.”
A hidden race against time
Toward the end of 2024, the Defense Ministry, the Air Force, and IDF’s Planning Directorate quietly launched a multi-pronged, secretive race against time to meet Bar’s demands. Technical surprise inspections and reviews were suddenly imposed on squadrons without explanation. Inspectors found what they suspected: while jets were airworthy for quick strikes on nearby Hamas or Hezbollah targets, they were not mission-ready for deep-strike missions to Iran—930 miles each way, with mid-air refueling and rapid rearming. These aging aircraft needed not just special treatments but many replacement parts—many of which were no longer in production by Lockheed Martin, Sikorsky or Boeing.
“We quietly enlisted the manufacturers, without disclosing the full reason, but they didn’t have all the solutions,” an IAF officer said. “So we turned to friendly nations to ask for rare spare parts. These were added to components 3D-printed here, mainly at the central maintenance unit at Tel Nof. We even approached defense ministers from countries that publicly condemn us over Gaza, convincing them to give up rare stockpiles. They didn’t know why.”
He added: “It was an unprecedented global operation in a hostile diplomatic climate. Remember, this wasn’t like the weeks after October 7, when the world sympathized with us. This was much harder due to the Gaza war and rising global protests.”
Quiet cooperation abroad
Officially, only two countries acknowledged military support for Israel: the U.S. and Germany. Other nations, such as France, spoke with a fork tongue or acted hypocritically. Italy—despite being led by a far-right government—reversed course in recent months, halting arms sales.
“President Macron made his animosity clear, even before last month’s anti-Israel grandstanding at the Paris Air Show,” a senior defense official said. “The French government froze sales of specialty equipment for Israeli defense manufacturing, and we had to improvise.”
To acquire key systems, the Defense Ministry and Planning Directorate devised cover stories for allied governments. Meanwhile, the U.S. provided not just a vast range of weaponry in recent months but also led an air and sea supply bridge involving thousands of spare parts.
“We asked them to reopen old production lines—and thanks to a new, friendlier tone in Washington, it happened,” said a senior officer responsible for U.S. military coordination.
The Planning Directorate kept up near-daily coordination with CENTCOM, particularly with its deputy commander, Vice Admiral Charles “Brad” Cooper. “Just like during the Gaza ground operation phase, he went all-in to help us—opening U.S. stockpiles around the world for critical IAF needs,” the officer said. “We even received specialized systems for helicopters on long-range missions—equipment we’ve never used before.”
A covert supply chain, regional architecture
One defense official described the silent flow of supplies across the region: “CENTCOM was all in—but this time, far more low-profile than after October 7. They sent equipment from global stockpiles, no questions asked. Some crucial parts arrived just a day or two before zero hour.”
U.S. support for the Iran operation peaked with the landing of the 8,000th cargo plane in Israel since October 7, alongside dozens of supply ships. “Each aircraft can carry about 120 bomb warheads. One ship brings around 3,000,” the source said.
IDF officials said the supply pipeline reached unprecedented scale. “The Air Force was rearmed over the past year with a decade’s worth of munitions and systems,” one officer noted. “We essentially executed two five-year buildup plans in under a year.”
Planning Directorate head Eyal Harel personally flew to Boeing’s plant in St. Louis to accelerate production and clear bottlenecks, finalizing the last details just six weeks before launch. Even Harel—fluent in U.S. military culture—was surprised by the Pentagon’s sweeping support, especially from new Joint Chiefs Chairman Dan Cane, considered far more pro-Israel than his predecessor.
Sensitive operational, aerial, and intelligence meetings were held weekly to prevent leaks. Israeli sources noted this new architecture—especially the early interception of Iran’s 1,000-strong UAV swarm, shot down hundreds of miles away in Jordan and Iraq—was unlike anything the region had seen.
One senior defense official concluded: “The most sensitive moment in this partnership was shifting from defensive coordination with the Americans—to their strike on Fordow. We didn’t know if President Trump would approve it. It wouldn’t have happened unless IDF succeeded first. The Americans struck Fordow based on our intelligence—after we cleared the area of Iranian air defenses.”
The demand for Israeli Air Force jets to operate with relative freedom over major parts of Iranian airspace was met faster than expected—by the third day of the operation. But that, in hindsight, was no guarantee. As preparations began, the Defense Ministry quietly established a small, classified team led by Director-General Amir Baram, with two critical goals for the home front: first, to bolster aerial defense, especially by closing gaps in interceptor missiles; second, to enhance alert and protection measures as much as possible.
Baram held roughly 20 meetings and site visits at the ministry’s weapons development center and was involved in many of the trial-and-error preparations. The result: 29 fatalities over 12 days—all in civilian areas such as residential neighborhoods. Far from the defense establishment’s original worst-case projections of 800 to 1,400 casualties.
Behind the scenes of a fragile success
Despite the results, success in real time felt fragile. Senior IAF commanders stationed in the war bunker at the central Tel Aviv base admitted to several nerve-wracking moments. Multiple fighter jets and “Ram” refueling planes suffered technical malfunctions mid-air, hundreds of miles from Israel. In one case, a warning light in a ground control unit of a large strategic UAV indicated a critical malfunction that could have ended in a crash on Iranian soil. Operators aborted the mission and executed an emergency landing in a secure location. The drone was recovered and returned for inspection and repair.
To prepare for such events, a dedicated emergency protocol was drafted by the Equipment Directorate and operational headquarters: rapid investigation teams were assigned to analyze drone or aircraft malfunctions within 48–72 hours and deliver quick conclusions.
“We faced situations that, under normal circumstances, would’ve grounded entire fleets for weeks,” said Brig. Gen. Shlomi, head of the Equipment Directorate. “But here, we couldn’t stop for even a moment. When it came to manned aircraft, we took zero chances. Pilots were in direct contact with us so we could prep service crews ahead of their landing from Iran—like Formula 1 pit stops.”
No manned aircraft lost
How does he sum it up? “Not everything went smoothly. We lost some important drones. But to finish an operation like this without a single manned aircraft down—that’s unprecedented. It came down to meticulous preparation. We brought in our best engineers and tech experts, including from Ofek, the IAF’s software unit, to reach that moment.”
To compensate for a shortage of refueling planes, the air force produced dozens of detachable fuel tanks over the past year, enabling aircraft to safely return from extended missions. Many of these tanks were later spotted on the ground in agricultural areas across Iraq and Syria—silent evidence of the missions flown above them during the 12-day campaign in June.
After each short landing, IAF crews removed the black boxes from returning aircraft to rapidly debrief the flights and their performance.
Get the Ynetnews app on your smartphone: Google Play: https://bit.ly/4eJ37pE | Apple App Store: https://bit.ly/3ZL7iNv
“We didn’t use AI, but we did rely on various algorithms that helped us learn quickly how to adapt and improve during the war,” added Shlomi. “We leaned on our people’s expertise and professionalism. For me, the technical division’s victory was this: In each nightly debrief with the air force commander, I could confidently say that the number of available aircraft would not constrain the next day’s mission planning.
“That’s no small thing. Our teams absorbed an endless stream of lessons—almost hourly—from flight maneuver angles over Iran, from route choices, and from payload configurations. Every mission is usually based on a predictive model. Here, there was no model—this had never been done before.”
Calls from the Arab world
Just hours after the ceasefire came into effect late last month and the dust from the bombing began to settle, phones started ringing in the military tower and the Defense Ministry. Down on the street, repair crews were already fixing damage caused by an Iranian missile the week prior. On the other end of the line were senior officers from Arab militaries in the region.
“Wow, you made history,” they told their Israeli counterparts.