When Ankara issues legal threats in the international arena and Jerusalem responds with harsh statements, it can seem as though Israel-Turkey relations have reached the point of no return. The public confrontation presents a simplistic picture: two countries on a direct collision course over values and ideology. But the analysis I offer, grounded in international law and security realpolitik, reveals a far more complex reality. Beneath the rhetorical smoke, Israel and Turkey are not monks cloistered in a moral monastery. They are rational actors in a ruthless geopolitical environment, linked by a largely hidden web of vital strategic interests.
To understand the current crisis, it is first necessary to unpack the contemporary use of "international law." Turkish moves in international tribunals and declarations of boycotts do not represent a fundamental break over norms but are part of the familiar practice of "lawfare." International law is being used here as a tactical weapon in the diplomatic arena, intended to raise the price of negotiations without breaking the rules of the game. At the same time, international maritime law and shipping arrangements in the eastern Mediterranean continue to provide a firm foundation that both sides are extremely careful not to undermine. Freedom of navigation, stable trade routes and the protection of offshore energy infrastructure are vital interests. Even when the political waters of the Mediterranean are turbulent, commercial flows and quiet legal ties continue beneath the radar.
Erdogan and Israel need each other right now
(Photo: AP/Yuki Iwamura, Kawnat HAJU / AFP, REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun/Pool)
A look at the broader picture reveals an even deeper convergence of interests in the regional and global arenas. Both countries have a clear interest in preventing a security vacuum in Syria and Lebanon that could be filled by Iranian-backed forces or unchecked radical organizations. Containing Shiite expansion and maintaining stable borders are shared objectives. Moreover, quiet strategic cooperation in the Caucasus, as reflected in both countries' close relations with Azerbaijan, demonstrates that when it matters most, core security and energy interests outweigh rhetorical rivalry. Turkey, which aspires to regional-power status, understands well that a complete rupture with Israel would deprive it of a valuable strategic mediator role and leave it isolated in Washington.
This is precisely where the United States enters the equation, serving as the shared Western anchor that both restrains and connects the various arenas. It is Israel's critical ally, Saudi Arabia's security patron and the strategic foundation of Turkey's membership in NATO. President Donald Trump's special relationship with Erdogan and the practical steps Washington has taken to advance Turkey's regional standing do not run counter to Israel's vital interests. Washington views a strong Turkey as a necessary counterweight to Iran and radical actors, while imposing a structural "glass ceiling" that prevents heated rhetoric from deteriorating into a physical confrontation.
A restraining and balancing force
Within this framework, the "Mecca Joint Defense Agreement" signed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan does not alter the threat map facing Israel. Rather, it serves a key Turkish objective: expanding its defense exports and strengthening its position vis-a-vis Saudi capital. Ankara's integration into a security axis with Riyadh, a country that shares Israel's underlying threat assessment and commitment to stability, serves as a restraining and balancing force. It binds Turkey to a security architecture aimed at preventing escalation and regional anarchy, with the tacit blessing of the United States, rather than creating an active front against Israel.
Ultimately, the reality under American auspices requires a clear-eyed strategy of "respect but suspect" — maintaining quiet channels while distinguishing between public noise and strategic needs. Yet clear-eyed analysis is no recipe for complacency. Israel must act decisively and strategically, in coordination with regional partners, across four main arenas:
- The maritime arena: In response to Turkey's "Blue Homeland" doctrine, which seeks to redraw maritime boundaries and cut Israel off from Europe, Israel must strengthen its trilateral alliance with Greece and Cyprus, including projects such as the Great Sea Interconnector, accelerate the development of independent infrastructure links and establish a formal maritime security mechanism in cooperation with Washington.
- The domestic arena: In response to the flow of tens of millions of dollars through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, known as TIKA, and affiliated organizations aimed at building Turkey's status as the "protector of Islam" in east Jerusalem and displacing Jordan, Israel should enact a comprehensive ban on hostile foreign funding in the city, curb quasi-governmental Turkish organizations and strengthen its active alliance with Jordan.
- The American channel: Given the structural blind spots in existing channels, Israel should demand the establishment of a dedicated strategic intelligence dialogue with the administration in Washington, focused exclusively on exposing funding networks and curbing Turkish expansion while simultaneously addressing the Iranian threat.
- The Saudi axis: Israel should capitalize on the Saudi royal family's concerns about the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology and propose close coordination with Riyadh in east Jerusalem, including civilian investment in cooperation with Jordan, alongside intelligence sharing and the integration of Red Sea and Mediterranean security concepts as part of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, or IMEC.
The Turkish challenge is not inevitable. It requires Israel to break free from outdated assumptions, recognize the complexity of a multi-front campaign and act with sophistication to safeguard its security and standing in the Middle East.
Prof. Mohammed Wattad is a full professor of law, president of Ramat Gan Academic College and a visiting senior researcher at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)